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FRIVOLOUS APPEALS:
THE UNCERTAIN FEDERAL RESPONSE
ROBERT J. MARTINEAU*
Frivolous appeals and abusive appeal tactics contribute to the enormous
workload of the federal courts of appeals. Because these courts have
been unsuccessful in defning clearly when and under what circum-
stances they will impose sanctions for frivolous appeals or abusive ap-
peal tactics, the deterrent effect of these sanctions has been minimal.
Professor Martineau proposes a new rule requiring sanctions for either
frivolous appeals or abusive appeal tactics, arguing that sanctions are
necessary toprotect both litigants and the ability of thefederal appellate
courts to decide cases in an expeditious andfair manner.
I. INTRODUCTION
Between 1961 and 1983, the number of appeals commenced in the
United States Courts of Appeals increased by 705 percent.' The
number of authorized judgeships, however, increased by only one hun-
dred percent. 2 During the twelve month period ending on June 30,
* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. Author, Modem Appellate Practice-
Federal and State Civil Appeals (1983); Circuit Executive, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
(1972-74). The author is greatly indebted to Patricia Davidson for assistance in the preparation of
the text and footnotes and Barbara Tesch for assistance in the preparation of the footnotes.
I. In 1961, 4204 appeals were filed. See DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1961 ANNUAL REPORT 115 [hereinafter cited as 1961 COURT RE-
PORT]. By 1983, the number of appeals had risen to 29,630. See DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 97 [hereinafter cited as
1983 COURT REPORT].
2. See 1961 COURT REPORT, supra note 1, at 116; 1983 COURT REPORT, supra note 1, at 97.
The number of authorized circuit judgeships has been increased periodically since 1961. The most
recent increase was from 97 to 132 in 1978. See 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (1982), as amended by Act of
Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 1629, 1632. Recently, Congress, as part of the
reconstitution of the bankruptcy court system, created 24 additional circuit judgeships. SeeBank-
ruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 201, 98 Stat. 333,
346-47.
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1983, nearly 30,000 appeals were filed in the circuit courts. 3 Both
courts and commentators have warned that this flood of appeals is a
threat to an effective federal appellate system.4 Many scholars have
proposed structural or jurisdictional changes to the federal appellate
system, but the only major response to date has been the division of the
Fifth Circuit into the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits.5 The creation of
thirty-five new circuit judgeships in 19786 was not intended as a long-
term solution to the problem, but was simply one response to bur-
geoning caseloads.
The federal appeals courts have been forced to develop new tech-
niques for disposing of substantially more cases with only a marginal
increase in the number of judges. Many changes in operating proce-
dures have dramatically increased the output of federal appellate
courts. These changes include dispositions without oral argument or
without written opinion or with neither, dispositions from the bench
3. 1983 COURT REPORT, supra note 1, at 97.
4. See, e.g., WSM, Inc. v. Tennessee Sales Co., 709 F.2d 1084, 1088 (6th Cir. 1983); NLRB
v. Lucy Ellen Candy Div. of F&F Laboratories, Inc., 517 F.2d 551, 554-55 (7th Cir. 1975); Furbee
v. Vantage Press, Inc., 464 F.2d 835, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972); P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M.
ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 4-7 (1976); R. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE:
FEDERAL AND STATE CIVIL APPEALS § 1.2, at 10 (1983); D. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS STAFF
AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOLUME 7-9 (1974); Meador, The Federal Judiciary-Inflation,
Mal[function, and a Proposed Course of Action, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 617, 618-21; Posner, Will the
Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984" An Essay on Delegation and Specialisation of the
JudicialFunction, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 761-67 (1983); Silas, Circuit Breaker, 70 A.B.A. J. 34, 34
(1984).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1982), as amended by Act of Oct. 14, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, § 2, 94
Stat. 1994. In 1982, Congress also created the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit by
joining the appellate division of the Court of Claims with the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. For various
proposals, see, for example, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON APPELLATE PROCE-
DURE, EFFICIENCY AND JUSTICE IN APPEALS: METHODS AND SELECTED MATERIALS (1977) (call-
ing for various penalties for frivolous appeals), evaluated in Note, Disincentives to Frivolous
Appeals: An Evaluation of an ABA Task Force Proposal, 64 VA. L. REV. 605, 611-24 (1978); CoM-
MISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL
PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975); H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:
A GENERAL VIEW 197 (1973) (recommending structural changes); Friendly, Averting the Floodby
Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 634, 640-57 (1974) (proposing structural and jurisdic-
tional changes); Godbold, Improvements in Appellate Procedure: Better Use ofAvailable Facilities,
66 A.B.A. J. 863 (1980) (calling for procedural modifications); Griswold, Helping the Supreme
Court by Reducing the Flow of Cases into the Courts of Appeals, 67 JUDICATURE 58, 60-66 (1983)
(proposing structural changes and an increase in the number of specialized federal courts); Phil-
lips, Diversity Jurisdiction: Problems anda Possible Solution, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 747 (1983) (argu-
ing that ultimate solution to flood of appeals would be the repeal of diversity jurisdiction).
In a recent speech criticizing the cost and delay involved in litigation, Justice William Rehn-
quist proposed the elimination of automatic appeals from the trial courts, suggesting that appellate
review be allowed "only where it is granted in the discretion of a panel of the appellate court."
(quoted in N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1984, at 27, col. 1.)
6. See supra note 2.
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immediately following oral argument, disposition on motion, settle-
ment conferences, use of central staff, and additional personal law
clerks for the judges.7
These judicial efforts have focused solely on one aspect of the
appellate process-the number of cases terminated by the courts of ap-
peals. Far less attention has been paid to reducing the number of ap-
peals coming to the appellate courts. The few proposals that seek to
reduce the number of appeals have primarily suggested reducing the
jurisdiction of the federal district courts---diversity and habeas corpus
are the most common targets-rather than restricting the appealability
of district court decisions.8 These proposals almost invariably require
legislative action because they affect jurisdiction.9
The federal courts of appeals are unable to change their own juris-
diction and thus can impose no major limitation on the number of ap-
peals coming to them.10 In the past several years, however, these courts
have relied increasingly upon the authority granted to them by two
statutes" and a federal rule of appellate procedure12 to impose sanc-
tions upon parties or attorneys taking frivolous appeals or using abu-
sive tactics during the pendency of an appeal. 13
The courts of appeals have set forth three principal purposes to be
achieved by the imposition of sanctions. The immediate objectives are
to compensate the opposing party for the time and expense that he has
7. See, e.g., R. MARTINEAU, supra note 4, § 1.3, at I 1 (observing that role of oral argument,
publication of opinions, and other aspects of system are subject to change); Godbold, supra note 5,
at 864 (discussing Fifth Circuit's limit on oral argument); Posner, supra note 4, at 767-75 (discuss-
ing law clerks and staff attorneys).
8. See Friendly, supra note 5, at 640-46 (elimination of diversity jurisdiction and other juris-
dictional changes); Griswold, supra note 5, at 65-66 (creating specialized appellate tribunals); Phil-
lips, supra note 5, at 749-56 & 749 n.6.
9. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-49 (1850) ("Congress, having the power to
establish the courts, must define their respective jurisdictions."). See generally M. REDISH, FED-
ERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 21-24 (1980). The
Supreme Court's decisions restricting the availability of habeas corpus to state prisoners challeng-
ing their convictions or the conditions of their confinement may have a similar effect. See Wain-
wright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977) (barring habeas corpus review when petitioner, without
excuse, failed to raise objection); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (no right to habeas
corpus claim after fourth amendment challenge was fully and fairly litigated).
10. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 & n.28 (1978) (Congress is to
decide changes in jurisdiction).
11. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1912, 1927 (1982). See infra notes 68 and 70.
12. FED. R. App. P. 38.
13. See Annot., 67 A.L.R. FED. 319 (1984). States have also addressed this problem. See,
Annot., 91 A.L.R.3D 661, 664 (1979); Comment, Mandatory Assessment of Damages Against an
UnsuccessfulAppellant: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 53 Miss. L.J. 281, 281-82 (1983).
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incurred 14 and to punish the offending person for wasting the limited
time and resources of the appellate court.' 5 The long-term objective is
deterrence16-reducing the number of appeals taken to the courts of
appeals and the amount of time spent on appeals.17 Deterring frivolous
appeals serves another purpose-protecting litigants in other cases
whose appeals are delayed because the court is spending time on the
frivolous appeals.' 8 Compensation will more likely be the objective
when the appellee files a motion seeking a monetary award, while de-
terrence will be cited more often when the court raises the issue sua
sponte. 19
The use of sanctions to penalize appellants and their attorneys is
not without difficulty. The fear of a sanction may discourage a person
14. See, e.g., Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 1981) (defend-
ant has a right to be free from costly, frivolous suits); Ruderer v. Fines, 614 F.2d 1128, 1132 (7th
Cir. 1980) (one goal is compensation). For decisions awarding costs of defending a frivolous ap-
peal, see, for example, Bank of Canton v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 636 F.2d 30,31 (2d Cir. 1980); Self
v. Self, 614 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1980); Exhibitors Poster Exch., Inc. v. National Screen Serv.
Corp., 543 F.2d 1106, 1107 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); Clarion Corp. v. American
Home Prod. Corp., 494 F.2d 860, 865-66 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974); Fluoro Elec.
Corp. v. Branford Assoc., 489 F.2d 320, 326 (2d Cir. 1973); Oscar Gruss & Son v. Lumbermens
Mut. Casualty Co., 422 F.2d 1278, 1284 (2d Cir. 1970); Lowe v. Willacy, 239 F.2d 179, 180 (9th
Cir. 1956) (per curiam).
15. For decisions penalizing frivolous appeals, see, for example, WSM, Inc. v. Tennessee
Sales Co., 709 F.2d 1084, 1088 (6th Cir. 1983); Van Arnem Co. v. CIS Leasing Corp., Nos. 80-
1258, 80-1275 (6th Cir. Jan. 5, 1982) (available Aug. 1, 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir file)
(double appellate costs assessed against party for unnecessarily wasting the time and resources of
the court); Asberry v. United States Postal Serv., 692 F.2d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1982); Simon &
Flynn, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 513 F.2d 832, 834-35 (2d Cir. 1975); Clarion Corp. v. American Home
Prod. Corp., 494 F.2d 860, 865-66 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974); Fluoro Elec. Corp.
v. Branford Assoc., 489 F.2d 320, 326 (2d Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Smith & Wesson, 424 F.2d 1072,
1073 (1st Cir. 1970).
16. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691 (1977); Whitney v. Cook, 99 U.S. 607, 607
(1879); Seyler v. Seyler, 678 F.2d 29,31 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Whtney, 99 U.S. at 607); McCon-
nell v. Critchlow, 661 F.2d 116, 118 (9th Cir. 1981); Ruderer v. Fines, 614 F.2d 1128, 1132 (7th
Cir. 1980).
17. Ruderer v. Fines, 614 F.2d 1128, 1132 (7th Cir. 1980).
18. Oberman, Federal Courts Commentary-Coping With the Rising Caseload ll D§6ning the
Frivolous CivilAppeal, 47 BRooKLYNm L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1981); see Nevijel v. North Coast Life
Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 1981); Ruderer v. Fines, 614 F.2d 1128, 1132 (7th Cir. 1980);
In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319, 322 (1st Cir. 1973).
19. Compare Fluoro Elec. Corp. v. Branford Assoc., 489 F.2d 320, 326 (2d Cir. 1973) (dam-
ages granted in response to plaintifts motion to compensate for expenses in answering wholly
frivolous appeal) and Self v. Self, 614 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1980) (court awarded damages
pursuant to appellee's motion to compensate for costs incurred by frivolous appeal) with Ruderer
v. Fines, 614 F.2d 1128, 1132 (7th Cir. 1980) (court denied motion because penalty goes beyond
compensation to deterrence of other such appeals) andVan Arnem Co. v. CIS Leasing Corp., Nos.
80-1258, 80-1275 (6th Cir. Jan. 5, 1982) (available Aug. 1, 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir
file) (court will award costs sua sponte under extraordinary circumstances to penalize party for
wasting time of court).
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with a valid claim from pursuing it on appeal.20 Although this danger
may exist even if it were clear when and under what circumstances a
sanction would be imposed, it is heightened substantially when there
are several different sources of authority for imposing a sanction,21
when there are multiple purposes for the sanction,22 when varying stan-
dards are used in judging whether an appeal is frivolous, 23 when the
relationship between frivolous appeal sanctions and abusive litigation
tactics is unclear,24 when the sanction is imposed without notice or an
opportunity to be heard,25 and when the procedure varies for initiating
consideration of a sanction.26
Because of these uncertainties, it is imperative that when courts
impose sanctions for frivolous appeals, they do so in accord with a pro-
cedure that is consistent with due process requirements. It is also es-
sential that courts develop a clearly articulated definition of frivolous
appeals, indicating, in particular, whether an objective or subjective
standard is used. Further, they must clearly distinguish between (1) a
sanction imposed for taking a meritless appeal, and (2) a sanction im-
posed for abusive litigation tactics during the pendency of an appeal
with merit. Unless these procedural and substantive requirements are
met, it is unlikely that the sanctions imposed by the courts of appeals
will reduce the number of frivolous appeals and abusive litigation tac-
tics. This article examines the sources of authority for the imposition of
sanctions, analyzes the cases in which sanctions have been imposed,
and proposes a revision in the statutes and rules governing the imposi-
tion of sanctions by federal courts of appeals.27
20. See NLRB v. Lucy Ellen Candy Div. of F&F Laboratories, Inc., 517 F.2d 551, 555 (7th
Cir. 1975); In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319, 322 (1st Cir. 1973); Flaherty v. Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637,
648, 646 P.2d 179, 186, 183 Cal. Rptr. 508, 515 (1982); Oberman, supra note 18, at 1058. For a
discussion of the reaction of attorneys and the press to the United States Supreme Court's award
of $500 damages to the opposing party for the filing of a frivolous certiorari petition in Tatum v.
Regents, 103 S. Ct. 3084 (1983), see REPORT OF UNITED STATES SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGE HARRY
PHILLIPS 2-3 (1983), filed with A.B.A. Standing Committee on Federal Judicial Improvements
(copy on file with author).
21. See infra notes 68-98 and accompanying text.
22. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 53-67 aDd accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 141-52 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 159-88 and accompanying text.
26. See id
27. This article is confined to a discussion of sanctions in civilappeals, and does not address
the issues associated with criminal appeals.
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II. IDENTIFYING THE FRIVOLOUS APPEAL
The definition of a frivolous appeal is a basic question that con-
fronts a court when determining whether to impose a sanction. A con-
cise, workable definition could help future litigants and counsel to
avoid bringing appeals that courts will later find to be frivolous. Unfor-
tunately, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
stated recently, "Frivolity, like obscenity, is often difficult to define." 28
To a certain degree the courts of appeals have dealt with frivolous ap-
peals by doing little more than describing what they see and labeling it
as frivolous. The various formulations that courts have used in identi-
fying what makes an appeal frivolous are set forth below.
A. Merits of Appeal
When a court finds an appeal to be frivolous, it usually labels the
appeal as "utterly without merit" or "no chance of success." 29 In at-
taching one of these labels to the appeal, the courts point to various
indicia of hopelessness. One indicator is the court's lack of jurisdiction
over the appeal. This can arise because the order appealed from is not
a final decision, 30 the action is barred by the statute of limitations, 31 the
appeal is untimely,32 the appellant lacks standing,33 or the federal
courts have no subject matter jurisdiction.34 These weaknesses do not
28. WSM, Inc. v. Tennessee Sales Co., 709 F.2d 1084, 1088 (6th Cir. 1983). Cf. Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I know [obscenity] when I see it.").
29. See, e.g., United States v. Potamkin Cadillac Corp., 697 F.2d 491, 492-93 (2d Cir.) ("no
merit whatever ... entirely frivolous"), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3128 (1983); Bankers Trust Co. v.
Publicker Indus., Inc., 641 F.2d 1361, 1367 (2d Cir. 1981) ("without the slightest chance of suc-
cess"); see also infra note 36.
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) ("The courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of ap-
peals from all final decisions of the district courts .... ) (emphasis added); see also Hastings v.
Maine-Endwell Cent. School Dist., 676 F.2d 893, 895 (2d Cir. 1982) (order not final because plain-
tiffs' claim for damages still pending); Good Hope Ref., Inc. v. Brashear, 588 F.2d 846, 847-48 (lst
Cir. 1978) (appeal from ruling on a motion in bankruptcy dismissed because ruling not final).
31. See In re Newport Harbor Assoc., 589 F.2d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 1978) (failure to comply with
strict six-month limitation period which is prerequisite to relief); see also McConnell v. Critchlow,
661 F.2d 116, 118 (9th Cir. 1981) (cause of action time-barred).
32. See Green v. Warden, 699 F.2d 364, 366-67 (7th Cir.) (failure to perfect appeal in timely
manner), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2436 (1983).
33. See Libby, McNeill & Libby v. City Nat'l Bank, 592 F.2d 504, 511 (9th Cir. 1978) ("We
do not believe that CNB [co-party] has standing to appeal."); see also National Acceptance Co. v.
Frigidmeats, Inc., 627 F.2d 764, 766 (7th Cir. 1980) (one "not a party lacks standing to make a
[60(b)] motion") (quoting C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2865
at 225-26 (1973)).
34. See Simon & Flynn, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 513 F.2d 832, 833 (2d Cir. 1975) (litigants had no
diversity of citizenship and claim did not arise under statute relating to copyrights); see also Burke
v. Miller, 639 F.2d 306, 306 (5th Cir. 1981) (affirming dismissal for lack of jurisdiction); Peltier v.
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go to the merits of the issues raised by the appellant, but present the
threshold question of jurisdiction.
In examining the merits of the issues raised by the appellant, the
courts have found an appeal to be frivolous if it has no legal basis. For
example, cases have been deemed frivolous if the appeal was filed in
the face of a long-established precedent with no reason given to change
the law35 or if the appellant makes only conclusory allegations with no
factual basis.36 Another type of frivolous appeal is one in which the
court cannot ascertain from the brief any intelligible claim made by the
appellant.37 In assessing penalties in this type of case, the court may
appear concerned with the quality of the brief rather than the merits of
the case, but the heart of the court's complaint is that no meritorious
claim is presented.
B. Conduct of the Appellant.
The other major factor examined by the appellate courts in identi-
fying the frivolous appeal is the conduct of the appellant. The conduct
falls into three main categories: dilatory conduct, conduct that mis-
leads the court, and unsuccessful prior litigation.
1. Dilatory Conduct.
a) In the trial court. Appellate courts have on occasion reviewed
the conduct of the appellant at trial to determine whether to impose a
sanction for a frivolous appeal. This conduct is usually listed in con-
junction with a discussion of the merits of the appeal and the appel-
Peltier, 548 F.2d 1083, 1084 (1st Cir. 1977) (removal statute does not give federal courts jurisdic-
tion over divorce action).
35. See Watson v. Callon Petroleum Co., 632 F.2d 646, 648 (5th Cir. 1980) (appeals do not
present a novel or unsettled question of Mississippi law); Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v.
DASA Corp., 605 F.2d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1978) ("it is too well established. . . to require dilation
here"); In re Newport Harbor Assoc., 589 F.2d 20, 23-24 (lst Cir. 1978) ("consistent body of
precedent"); Furbee v. Vantage Press, Inc., 464 F.2d 835, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("Notwithstanding
the clear state of law, Furbee pressed his appeal.").
36. See, e.g., Veenkant v. Burdick, No. 82-1583 (6th Cir. May 4, 1983) (available Aug. 1, 1983
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir file) (appeal conclusory in nature); McCoy v. Gordon, 709 F.2d
1060, 1063 (5th Cir. 1983) (appeal lacks all substance); Wood v. McEwen, 644 F.2d 797, 802 (9th
Cir. 1981) ("affidavit contains only conclusionary statements and personal opinions"), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 942 (1982); see also United States v. 1-12 Garden Apartments, 703 F.2d 900, 904 (5th Cir.
1983) (claim supported only by bravado); Asberry v. United States Postal Serv., 692 F.2d 1378,
1380 (Fed. Cir. 1982) ("There is not the slightest evidence, and Asberry cites none."); McConnell
v. Critchlow, 661 F.2d 116, 118 (9th Cir. 1981) (no basis for appeal).
37. See Burke v. Miller, 639 F.2d 306, 306 (6th Cir. 1981) (referring to brief as "legal spun
sugar"); White v. United States, 588 F.2d 650, 651 (8th Cir. 1978) (plaintiff unable to present
intelligibly his claims); Mancuso v. Indian Harbor Belt K.R., 568 F.2d 553, 554 (7th Cir. 1978)
(finding most of the material in appellant's fifty-page brief irrelevant).
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lant's conduct after the appeal is filed. Improper conduct includes
refusal to participate or undue delay in discovery,38 failure to timely
file papers,39 failure to attend meetings or court hearings,40 failure to
respond to requests from the court,4' and filing a proliferation of mo-
tions.42 Several courts have cited findings by the trial judge that the
original law -suit-was frivolous or was filed or conducted in bad faith.43
b) In the appellate court. Once the appeal is filed, the appellant
can cause substantial delay in disposition of the appeal by tardiness in
ordering the transcript, having the record forwarded to the appellate
court, or filing the brief and appendix.44 To the appellate court, the
most significant question in considering the dilatory conduct of the ap-
pellant is whether he will benefit by delay. Most commonly, the benefit
arises from delaying the execution of the judgment from which the ap-
peal is taken.45 If the appeal has no merit, that is strong evidence that
38. See, e.g., TIF Instruments, Inc. v. Collette, 713 F.2d 197, 198 (6th Cir. 1983) (failure to
conduct discovery or answer interrogatories); Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, 699
F.2d 484,485 (9th Cir. 1983) (flagrant abuse of the discovery process), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1445
(1984); Wood v. McEwen, 644 F.2d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 1981) (refusal to participate in discovery),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 942 (1982); Ohio v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 570 F.2d 1370, 1371 (10th Cir.)
(delay in discovery matters), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978); Overmyer v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.,
554 F.2d 539, 541 (2d Cir. 1977) (refusal to appear for deposition).
39. See, e.g., In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319, 320 (1st Cir. 1973) (attorney filed late motions for
extensions to file answers).
40. See, e.g., TIF Instruments, Inc. v. Collette, 713 F.2d 197, 198 (6th Cir. 1983) (appellant
did not appear or produce documents for appellee's discovery); Overmyer v. Fidelity & Deposit
Co., 554 F.2d 539, 541 (2d Cir. 1977) (appellant refused several times to appear despite contempt
orders).
41. See, e.g., TIF Instruments, Inc. v. Collette, 713 F.2d 197, 199 (6th Cir. 1983) (appellant
refused to comply with court-ordered discovery); Overmyer v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 554 F.2d
539, 541 (2d Cir. 1977) (appellant refused to appear for examination after directed by the court to
do so); In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319, 320 (1st Cir. 1973) (attorney failed to file memorandum in
accordance with court order).
42. See, e.g., Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 605 F.2d 35, 40 n.5 (2d
Cir. 1978) (filing of repeated, meritless motions constitutes a pattern of bad faith and harassment
and warrants the award of double costs and damages).
43. See, e.g., TIF Instruments, Inc. v. Collette, 713 F.2d 197, 199, 201 (6th Cir. 1983) (trial
judge found that grounds urged for reversal were patently frivolous and were asserted in bad
faith); Ellingson v. Burlington N., Inc., 653 F.2d 1327, 1332 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The court below
found specifically that [plaintifi's] lawsuit was filed in bad faith. This finding is inescapable
44. For a discussion of the procedural requirements upon filing a notice of appeal, see R.
MARTINEAU, supra note 4, at §§ 6.2-6.9.
45. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Publicker Indus., 641 F.2d 1361, 1367 (2d Cir. 1981) (court
concluded appellant delayed payment of judgment because of differential between legal interest
rate and money-market rates); Overmyer v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 554 F.2d 539, 540 (2d Cir.
1977) (misuse ofjudicial system to avoid payment ofjudgment). In imniigration cases, for exam-
ple, this dilatory conduct will result in a delay in deportation of the immigrant from the United
States. See Der-Rong Chour v. INS, 578 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1978) ("[Alliens ... use the
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the appeal is taken for delay or not in good faith.46
2. Conduct that Misleads the Court. Although not directly rele-
vant to the question whether the appeal is frivolous, improper conduct
by the appellant may influence appellate courts in deciding whether to
impose a sanction.47 This improper conduct includes misquoting rele-
vant authority or omitting key language in an opinion,48 changing fac-
tual representations to support post-trial motions,49 or misrepresenting
the facts as established by the record.50
3. Prior Litigation. Other evidence indicating a frivolous appeal
is the appellant's conduct of prior litigation. Courts often cite the pres-
ent litigation and appeal as merely part of a series of lawsuits and ap-
peals in which the appellant has engaged with no success and no
chance of success.51 The courts have thus looked to the cumulative
federal courts. . . to stall departure. . . as long as possible."), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 980 (1979);
Acevedo v. INS, 538 F.2d 918, 920 (2d Cir. 1976) (petition filed to delay deportation for nearly a
year); In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319, 322 (1st Cir. 1973) (operation of immigration laws confer
automatic benefit to some who may not deserve it).
46. See, e.g., Der-Rong Chour v. INS, 578 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1978) (baselessness of peti-
tion indicates tactic designed to stall departure), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 980 (1979); Acevedo v. INS,
538 F.2d 918, 920 (2d Cir. 1976) ("[Clomplete unsubstantiality. . . indicates that it was not filed
in good faith.").
47. See, e.g., Lewis v. Brown & Root, Inc., 711 F.2d 1287, 1292 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Worse, the
irresponsible manner in which the litigation was conducted further multiplied these needless pro-
ceedings." (emphasis in original)), modjfed on other grounds, 722 F.2d 209 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 2690 (1984).
48. See, e.g., McCandless v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 697 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir. 1983)
(attorney misquoted case by leaving out a sentence which undercut his position); Bankers Trust
Co. v. Publicker Indus., Inc. 641 F.2d 1361, 1366-67 (2d Cir. 1981) (omitted key phrase within
quotation); Griffin Wellpoint Corp. v. Munro-T angstroth, Inc., 269 F.2d 64, 67 (Ist Cir. 1959)
(appellant's counsel cited case but omitted key footnote).
49. See, e.g., Medina v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 737 F.2d 140, 145 (1st Cir. 1984) (misstate-
ments and misrepresentations in the brief); United States v. Potamkin Cadillac Corp., 697 F.2d
491, 495 (2d Cir.) ("baseless and inconstant character of the arguments" made by attorney), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 3128 (1983).
50. See, e-g., General Brewing Co. v. Law Firm of Gordon, Thomas, Honeywell, Malanca,
Peterson & O'Hearn, 694 F.2d 190, 192 (9th Cir. 1982) (appellant "deceptively distorted the dis-
trict court record"); Bankers Trust Co. v. Publicker Indus., Inc., 641 F.2d 1361, 1367 (2d Cir. 1981)
(appellant quoted portion of jury charge out of context); Mancuso v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R.,
568 F.2d 553, 554 (7th Cir. 1978) (appellant misrepresented lower court's order).
51. See, eg., Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, 699 F.2d 484, 485 (9th Cir.
1983) (latest in a series of suits), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1445 (1984); Ruderer v. Fines, 614 F.2d
1128, 1130 (7th Cir. 1980) (appellant initiated 68 prior lawsuits and virtually all were dismissed);
Overmyer v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 554 F.2d 539, 542 (2d Cir. 1977) (court, quoting lower court
decision, calls series of actions a "litany of evasion"); Exhibitors Poster Exch. v. National Screen
Serv. Corp., 543 F.2d 1106, 1106 (5th Cir.) (court refers to past history of antitrust litigation), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977). But see Miracle Mile Assoc. v. City of Rochester, 617 F.2d 18, 21 (2d
Cir. 1980) (court distinguishes appeal from earlier similar appeals).
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effect of the prior litigation and the present appeal. The prior litigation
can be used to establish the lack of merit in the present appeal or the
bad faith of the appellant in taking the present appeal.5 2
III. SELECTION OF STANDARD
A. Subjective or Objective Standard
Before a court can decide whether to impose a sanction, it must
first decide what evidence it will consider in making that determina-
tion. For example, there is a clear distinction between subjective and
objective evidence.53 If subjective evidence is considered, then the
court will focus on the personal motives of the appellant or his attor-
ney. Some courts have held that the appellant must have acted in bad
faith andbrought a meritless appeal in order for an appeal to be con-
sidered frivolous.54 Under this standard the intent of the appellant is
the key factor. The bad faith usually consists of deliberately causing
delay in order to occasion needless expense for the appellee or of deny-
ing the appellee the benefit of the judgment for as long as possible. 55
The sincerity of the appellant can be significant in determining whether
an appeal is frivolous.56
Some courts, on the other hand, have applied what appears to be
an objective standard.5 7 Although no federal court has used the
phrase, the California Supreme Court has applied a "reasonably pru-
dent attorney" standard asking whether a reasonably prudent attorney
52. See, e.g., Shuffman v. Hartford Textile Corp., 659 F.2d 299, 305 (2d Cir. 1981) (bad faith
in light of flood of similar meritless appeals), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1018 (1982).
53. For a discussion of these two standards, see Flaherty v. Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637, 649-50,
646 P.2d 179, 186-87, 183 Cal. Rptr. 508, 515-16 (1982).
54. See, eg., Malhiot v. Southern California Retail Clerks Union, 735 F.2d 1133, 1138 (9th
Cir. 1984) ("In this court, application of Section 1927 requires bad faith or intentional misconduct
by counsel."); TIF Instruments, Inc. v. Collette, 713 F.2d 197, 201 (6th Cir. 1983) (damages
against attorney awarded because appeal urged in bad faith); Miracle Mile Assoc. v. City of Roch-
ester, 617 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1980) (court does not award attorney's fees absent bad faith); West
Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1092 (2d Cir.) ("imposition of sanctions ... is
highly unusual and requires a clear showing of bad faith"), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). Bul
see Flaherty v. Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637, 650, 646 P.2d 179, 187, 183 Cal. Rptr. 508, 516 (1982)
(appeal should be held frivolous when prosecuted for improper motive or when it indisputably has
no merit).
55. See supra note 45.
56. See, e.g., American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vick, 268 F.2d 183, 184 (5th Cir. 1959)
(denying sanction under local rule 30 due to evidence of appellant's sincere conviction that verdict
was wrong).
57. See NLRB v. Lucy Ellen Candy Div. of F&F Laboratories, Inc., 517 F.2d 551, 555 (7th
Cir. 1975) (court measured bad faith using a reasonable and objective standard). Cf. Flaherty v.
Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637, 649, 646 P.2d 179, 187, 183 Cal. Rptr. 508, 516 (1982) (objective standard
looks at merits of appeal from reasonable person's perspective).
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would have brought the appeal in good faith.58 An examination of the
record, briefs, and argument provides the answer to this question,59 and
the actual good faith or sincerity of the appellant is not considered.
The two standards, subjective and objective, can easily be con-
fused, however, because typically there is no direct evidence of the in-
tent of the appellant in taking the appeal. The court can only infer the
bad faith of the appellant from what is reflected in the record, briefs,
and oral argument. Thus, whether the court is applying a subjective or
objective standard, it will examine the same evidence. In most cases,
consequently, there will be little difference in the result regardless of
the standard used.
B. Intentional or Negligent Conduct Standard
Rather than viewing the question as one of choosing an objective
or subjective standard, another approach is to view the issue as one
requiring a choice between a negligence standard and an intent stan-
dard. One commentator has articulated three standards similar to
those used in tort law, suggesting that some courts impose sanctions for
negligent conduct, some for intentional conduct, and others only when
conduct is malicious.60
An intentional or maliciously frivolous appeal is brought with the
purpose of harassing the opponent or delaying execution of the judg-
ment.61 The language of the early court rules reflects such a standard.62
On the other hand, a negligently brought frivolous appeal has no
chance of success but was brought due to carelessness or ignorance.
58. See Flaherty v. Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637, 649, 646 P.2d 179, 187, 183 Cal. Rptr. 508, 516
(1982); Kirsch v. Duryea, 21 Cal. 3d 303, 309, 578 P.2d 935, 939, 146 Cal. Rptr. 218, 222 (1978).
For additional discussion of Faherly, see The California Supreme Court Survey, 10 PEPPERDINE L.
REv. 167, 174-77 (1982).
59. See Veenkant v. Burdick, No. 82-1583 (6th Cir. May 4, 1983) (available Aug. 1, 1983 on
LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir file) (order sanctioning double costs based on record and briefs).
60. See Comment, Awards o/Attorneys' Fees Against Attorneys: Roadway Express, Inc. v.
Piper, 60 B.U.L. REv. 950, 962-68 (1980).
61. Id at 962-64, 966-68. See, e.g., Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp.,
560 F.2d 1078, 1088 (2d Cir. 1977) ("An action is brought in bad faith when the claim is entirely
without color and has been asserted wantonly for purposes of harassment or delay or for other
improper reasons."). Courts have inferred a bad intent by looking at the conduct of the appellant
or the attorney. See Hastings v. Maine-Endwell Cent. School Dist., 676 F.2d 893, 897-98 (2d Cir.
1982) (intent inferred from "blatantly baseless arguments"); Peltier v. Peltier, 548 F.2d 1083, 1083
(Ist Cir. 1977) (appellant's attorney had unsuccessfully attempted same course before); NLRB v.
Lucy Ellen Candy Div. of F&F Laboratories, Inc., 517 F.2d 551, 555 (7th Cir. 1975) ("law may
become so clear and well established that persistence in a course could be determinative of bad
faith"); Furbee v. Vantage Press, Inc., 464 F.2d 835, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (appellant aware that
case law supporting opposing side was "unambiguous and unwaivering [sic]").
62. See infra notes 81-82.
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For example, appeals taken in the face of well-settled law or lack of
federal jurisdiction may be the result of careless research or inept legal
analysis.6 3 Under a negligence standard, the court would examine the
legal and factual bases for the appeal and determine whether a reason-
ably competent attorney would have brought the appeal. These matters
go not to the intent of the appellant, but to the state of the law or the
record.
The intentional-negligent conduct standard is in some respects
similar to the subjective-objective standard. The intentional and sub-
jective standards primarily examine the state of mind of the appellant
in taking the appeal, while the objective and negligence standards focus
on the legal and factual issues involved in the case from the viewpoint
of the "reasonably prudent attorney."
C. Frivolous Taking of Appeal-The Frivolous Conduct of Appeal
Standard
In most cases the central issue is whether the appeal is frivolous,
either because of the lack of merit of the appeal or the bad faith of the
appellant. In determining that an appeal is frivolous, the courts may
have been influenced less by the merits of the appeal than by the man-
ner in which the appeal was conducted.64 Such a determination, how-
ever, is usually accompanied by a declaration that the issues raised are
without merit.65 While courts have used the conduct on appeal as evi-
dence in support of the finding of the frivolousness of the appeal and
bad faith in prosecuting it,66 no court has yet treated an appeal with
some merit as frivolous solely because of the manner in which it was
conducted.67
63. See, e.g., Simon & Flynn, Inc., v. Time, Inc., 513 F.2d 832, 833 (2d Cir. 1975) (sanction
imposed for appealing dismissal in case where lack of diversity jurisdiction was so obvious as to
suggest careless research or drafting, and where assertion of federal question jurisdiction was con-
trary to precedent).
64. See supra notes 38-52 and accompanying text.
65. See Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 605 F.2d 35, 39 (2d Cir.1978)
("baseless and frivolous claims").
66. See supra note 47.
67. The Fifth Circuit came the closest in Lewis v. Brown & Root, Inc., 722 F.2d 209, 210 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2690 (1984). The court sua sponte reconsidered its affirmance of the
trial court's judgment and award of fees. It altered its decision to a partial affirmance, but assessed
double costs and attorney fees for the appeal. The court reasoned that, although it granted some
relief on appeal, "it was relief for which plaintiff's counsel made little or no contention based on a
record defect discovered by us--not by counsel." Lewis, 722 F.2d at 210 n.*. Thus, the court
imposed a sanction for frivolousness because, even though the facts of the case revealed some
merit, appellant's counsel failed to appeal on meritorious grounds. However, the court did grant
relief based on the merits 'of the claim.
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Each of the three standards raises essentially the same issue:
whether the more important consideration is the lack of merit of the
appeal or the motive of the appellant in taking the appeal. Most opin-
ions on sanctions for frivolous appeals do not expressly state which
standard they apply; the standard can only be inferred from the specific
items of evidence cited by the courts in support of their conclusions.
The opinions of the courts do not distinguish among the three stan-
dards, often citing the types of evidence appropriate to one standard in
support of another. This lack of precision can make it very difficult for
attorneys and litigants to predict which standard the court will use in
reviewing their conduct. Thus, it is less likely that they will avoid the
offending conduct.
IV. SOURCES OF AUTHORITY FOR IMPOSING SANCTIONS
Federal appellate courts can base the imposition of sanctions for
the bringing of frivolous appeals upon three types of authority-stat-
ute, rule, and inherent power.
A. Statutes.
Section 1912 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1912, provides that
when a judgment is affirmed by the Supreme Court or a court of ap-
peals, the court has the discretion to allow the prevailing party "just
damages for his delay, and single or double costs. ' '68 Some version of
this language has been among the federal statutes continuously since its
original enactment in 1789; the present language dates from 1948.69
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1982). This statute is directly traceable to a statute enacted by the first
Congress. Section 23 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 85, provides in pertinent part:
"whereupon such writ of error the Supreme or a circuit court shall affirm a judgment or decree,
they shall adjudge or decree to the respondent in error just damages for his delay, and single or
double costs at their discretion."
This section became applicable to appeals by virtue of an 1803 statute directing that appeals
be handled in accordance with the procedures for writs of error. See Act of Mar. 3, 1803, § 2, 2
Stat. 244, 244.
69. When the Revised Statutes were enacted in 1873, the provision was continued as section
1010, but with some semantic changes that could have been significant. Rev. Stat. tit. 13, ch. 18,
§ 1010 (1878). Instead of making the award of damages and single or double costs discretionary
with the court, section 1010 provided that the court "shalladjudge to the respondents in error just
damages for his delay, and single or double costs, at its discretion." Id (emphasis added). This
language would appear to make damages for delay a matter of right to the prevailing party, with
only single or double costs to be awarded in the discretion of the court. This statute was not,
however, applied in this manner and the award of both damages and costs remained discretionary.
See, e.g., Wagner Elec. Mfg. v. Lyndon, 262 U.S. 226, 233 (1923) (section 1010 gives the Court the
power, upon the affirmance of any judgment or decree, to impose just damages for delay); Deming
v. Carlisle Packing Co., 226 U.S. 102, 109 (1912) (statute empowers court to award damages);
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The second statutory basis for the imposition of sanctions is sec-
tion 1927 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1927. In its present form,
that statute provides that an attorney "who so multiplies the proceed-
ings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously" can be required by the
court "to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys'
fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct. 70
The section has its origin in legislation enacted in 1813.71 The
original act provided that if any attorney "shall appear to have multi-
plied the proceedings in any cause before the court so as to increase
costs unreasonably and vexatiously, such person may be required by
order of court to satisfy any excess of costs so incurred.172 This statute
applied to all courts of the United States, not merely the appellate
courts.7 3 A major change in section 1927, enacted in 1980, expanded
the liability of an attorney to include not only excess costs but also
Amory v. Amory, 91 U.S. 356, 357 (1875) (under Rev. Stat. § 1010, court can award damages for
delay). Section 1012 of the Revised Statutes made the same provision applicable to appeals.
When the first United States Code was adopted in 1926, former section 1010 was incorpo-
rated as 28 U.S.C. § 878 (1926). The language appearing to mandate damages but making costs
discretionary remained unchanged in the 1926 Code. See Ballou v. Davis, 75 F.2d 138, 141 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied 295 U.S. 766 (1935).
The next major revision of the Code was in 1948, and 28 U.S.C. § 1912 in its present form
was adopted. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 954. The reviser's note to section 1912 in
the U.S.C.A. states that the new section is a combination of sections 878 and 1141(c)(4) of the
Internal Revenue Code. The latter section, which was enacted in 1939, provided that on appeals
from the Board of Tax Appeals, an appellate court "shall have the power to impose damages in
any case where the decision of the Board is affirmed and it appears that the petition was filed
merely for delay." I.R.C. § 1141(c)(4) (1940). The effect of the consolidation was to put the award
of both damages and costs expressly in the discretion of the appellate court. The section has re-
mained unchanged since 1948.
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982). For the application of this statute at the trial level, see Com-
ment, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the Judicial Process, 44 CHi. L. REv.
619, 623-29 (1977); cf. Prossnitz, FinesAgainst the TrialLawyer, LITIG., Fall 1983, at 36 (discussing
use of section 1927 and local rules to sanction lazy attorneys).
71. The legislative history of section 1927 was reviewed by the Supreme Court in Roadway
Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 759-61 (1980). A bill to amend the section was pending at the
time Roadway Express was decided, and this bill was referred to by the Court in its opinion. Id at
760 n.8. Nothing in the legislative history of the 1980 act, however, refers to the Court's decision.
72. Act of July 22, 1813, ch. 14, § 3, 3 Stat. 19, 21.
73. The section referred to proceedings "in a court of the United States or of the territories
thereof." Id This measure was substantially reenacted in 1853 as part of a bill dealing with the
costs and fees for all federal proceedings. Act of February 26, 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 161, 162. The
1813 provision was codified as section 982 of the Revised Statutes of 1875 without change. Rev.
Stat. tit. 13, ch. 18, § 982 (1878). It was later codified in section 829 of title 28 of the 1928 code and
then as section 1927 of title 28 of the present code.
The only change in the section prior to 1980 was the insertion of the word "personally" in
1948 to make it clear that the attorney and not the client bears the liability for the penalty. See
Reviser's Note, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1927 (West 1950).
FRIVOL O US APPEALS
expenses and attorney fees. 74
B. ]Rule 38.
Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (Appellate
Rule 38) provides that a court of appeals may award just damages and
single or double costs to the appellee if it determines that an appeal is
frivolous.75 The text of the rule does not mention delay, but the rule is
entitled "Damages for Delay."
There was no comparable provision under Rule 73 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which governed appeals in civil cases prior to
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in 1968.76
The advisory committee note to Appellate Rule 38 refers to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1912, probably because the language of the rule is very similar to the
statute. 77 The note further states that the usual circuit rule on the same
subject provided for damages for delay but that the courts had properly
allowed damages, attorney fees, and other expenses without requiring a
showing that the appeal resulted in delay. The committee note con-
cludes by stating that damages are allowed in the discretion of the court
when an appeal is frivolous "as a matter of justice to the appellee and
as a penalty against the appellant. 78T No mention is made of protecting
the appellate court and other litigants from frivolous appeals as addi-
tional bases for sanctions.
Before the adoption of Appellate Rule 38, circuit rules were used
to impose sanctions.79 Appellate Rule 38 was based in part on these
circuit rules80 which, in turn, appear to have been taken from the then-
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982). The amendment to section 1927 was a minor part of a larger bill
dealing primarily with aspects of the enforcement of the antitrust laws. See 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws (94 Stat.) 2716. The conference committee managers' report on the bill stated
that the amendment was designed to reduce delay in the courts resulting from dilatory tactics by
attorneys. Id at 2782. The report also stated that when courts attempt to use the section to impose
a sanction, the attorney should be accorded due process procedural protections prior to the impo-
sition of the sanction. Id at 2783.
75. FED. R. App. P. 38 ("If a court of appeals shall determine that an appeal is frivolous, it
may award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee.").
76. For text of the former rule, see 9 J. MOORE, B. WARD & J. LUCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 203.21 (2d ed. 1983).
77. FED. R. App. P. 38 advisory committee note, reprinted in J. MOORE, B. WARD & J. LUCAS,
supra note 76, at 238.01[Z] and in U.S.C.S. Court Rules (Law. Co-op. 1983).
78. Id
79. See infra notes 80 & 82.
80. The advisory committee observed that, for example, Fourth Circuit Rule 20 allowed
damages for delay. See FED. R. App. P. 38 advisory committee note; supra note 77. The note also
refers to 28 U.S.C. § 1912.
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current Supreme Court rule.8' The circuit rules, as well as the Supreme
Court rule, provided for a sanction, usually at the rate of ten percent of
the judgment, if the appeal or writ was taken for the purpose of delay
and resulted in delay.82
81. Compare Sup. Ct. R. 23(3), 62 U.S. (21 How.) xiii(1858) with circuit rules listed infra note
82. The first federal court rule that authorized an appellate court to impose a sanction for a
frivolous appeal appears to be Rule 17 of the United States Supreme Court, adopted in 1803. 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) xviii (1803). That rule provided that damages of 10 percent per year on the
amount of the judgment shall be awarded in "all cases where a writ of error shall delay the
proceedings on the judgment of the circuit court, and shall appear to have been sued out merely
for delay .. " Id Rule 18, adopted at the same time, provided that if there were a real contro-
versy in the case, the damages would be at the rate of six percent per year. Id Under both rules,
interest was to be computed as part of the damages. A general but unnumbered rule was adopted
in 1803 and 1807 and provided that damages were to be calculated from the date of the judgment
to the date of the affirmance. See Boyce's Executors v. Grundy, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 275, 289 (1835)
(damages to be calculated on the amount of the judgment). In 1858, the Supreme Court adopted a
major revision of its rules. In that revision the provisions as to damages for delay became Rule
23(3). 62 U.S. (21 How.) xiii (1858). The rule was the same as former Rule 17 but the damages
were calculated from the date of the judgment in the trial court to the date the judgment was paid.
id
Because Rule 23 did not make it clear whether normal interest was part of the 10 percent as
had been provided in the earlier rule, it was amended in 1871 to read that in the case of a writ
sued out merely for delay "damages at the rate of 10 percent, in addition to interest" were to be
awarded upon the amount of the judgment. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) (1871). This rule remained the
same (with the exception of changing the reference from writ of error to appeals following the
1925 statute which abolished writs of error in favor of appeals) until 1954 when another complete
revision of the rules was made. 74 S. Ct. 931-78 (1954). See generally Slaker v. O'Connor, 278
U.S. 188, 190 (1920); Wagner Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Lyndon, 262 U.S. 226, 233 (1922). See also Sup.
Ct. R. 30, 306 U.S. 710 (1938). The new Rule 56(2) continued the prior penalty of 10 percent
damages for an appeal taken for the purpose of delay. It added, however, Rule 56(4) to cover
writs of certiorari. 74 S. Ct. at 975. See Wiener, The Supreme Court'r New Rules, 68 HARV. L.
REv. 20, 64 (1954) (discussing purpose of Rule 56(4)). It gave the Court power to assess "reason-
able damages" to the respondent for his delay if a writ was filed "and there appears to be no
ground for granting such a writ." 74 S. Ct. at 975.
The Court revised its rules again in 1980. See 28 U.S.C.A. Sup. Ct. Rules (West Supp. 1984)
The damages rule was substantially changed. At present, Rule 49.2 provides simply that the
Court may award "appropriate damages" when an appeal or petition for a writ of certiorari is
"frivolous." Sup. CT. R. 49.2. Thus it is not necessary to show either actual delay or a purpose to
delay for the court to award damages, and there is no stated limit on the amount or type of
damages the court can award. The current Supreme Court rule is very similar to Appellate Rule
38. See supra note 75.
82. See, e.g., 3D CIR. R. 34(2), quotedin United States ex rel Soda v. Montgomery, 269 F.2d
752, 755 n.4 (3d Cir. 1959) ("In all cases where an appeal delays the proceedings on the judgment
or decree of the district court, and appears to have been sued out merely for delay, damages at a
rate not exceeding 10 per cent, in addition to interest may be awarded upon the amount payable
under the judgment or decree."); 4TH CIR. R. 20, construedin Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Davis, 127
F.2d 780, 783 (4th Cir. 1942) (motion made for damages under Rule 20 "on the ground that the
appeal has been taken merely for delay"); 5TH CIR. R. 30(2), construed in Traders & Gen. Ins. Co.
v. McClary, 241 F.2d 462, 462 (5th Cir. 1957) (per curiam) (court not satisfied that appeal was
"sued out merely for delay" so as to call for award of damages under the rule); 6TH CIR. R. 25(2),
quoted in Nordmeyer v. Sanzone, 315 F.2d 780, 781 (6th Cir. 1963) (per curiam) ("In any case




The inherent authority of a federal appeals court to impose a sanc-
tion for taking a frivolous appeal or for abusive tactics in the conduct
of an appeal has only recently been recognized by the United States
Supreme Court in Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper.83 On its facts, Road-
way Express involved a trial court's imposition of attorney fees against
counsel as a sanction for failure to comply with discovery orders, and a
narrow reading of the opinion could limit it to that type of case. The
Court, however, framed the issue 84 and its holding85 in the broadest
been taken merely for delay, damages not exceeding 10 per cent of the amount of the judgment in
addition to interest may be awarded and added to the judgment."); 9TH CIR. R. 24(2), construed in
Rederi A/B Soya v. SS Grand Grace, 369 F.2d 159, 165 (9th Cir. 1966) (damages may be assessed
under Rule 24 where purpose of appeal is delay).
Another predecessor to Rule 38 was Rule 73(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
which dealt with bond on appeal For text of former Rule 73, see 9 J. MOORE, B. WARD & J.
LUCAS, supra note 76, at 1203.21 (2d ed. 1983). It provided that the amount of the bond should be
fixed to cover not only the amount of the judgment but also appeal costs, interest and "damages
for delay." Id Rule 73 was abrogated in 1968 when the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
were adopted, see id at 1 203.21, but no comparable provision was included in those rules. The
repealed provision can be traced to the Judiciary Act of 1789, in which it was provided that good
and sufficient security should cover "all damages and costs" if a writ of error were unsuccessful.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84-85. This provision was in section 22 of the Act,
while section 23, the predecessor of 28 U.S.C. § 1912, provided that if the judgment or decree were
affirmed, the respondent was entitled to receive just damages for his delay. See supra note 68 and
accompanying text. Although it was not entirely clear on the face of the statute, the Supreme
Court held that the bond covered the amount of the judgment. Catlett v. Brodie, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 553, 554-55 (1824); see also Jerome v. McCarter, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 17, 29 (1874) (dis-
cusses distinctions between actions at law for recovery of money not otherwise secured, as in
Calet, and actions where the property in controversy necessarily follows the event of the suit, as
in real actions, replevin, or suits on mortgages; or where the property is in custody). When Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 73(d) was adopted, it expressly made the bond cover the amount of
the judgment, thus adopting the interpretation the courts had given to the statute. This rule pro-
vided that, when the judgment is for the recovery of money not otherwise secured "the bond shall
be fixed at such sum as will cover the whole amount of the judgment remaining unsatisfied. .
See 9 J. MOORE, B. WARD & J. LUCAS, supra note 76, at 203.21.
83. 447 U.S. 752 (1980). See also Miranda v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 710 F.2d 516, 520
(9th Cir. 1983) (construing Roadway Express as reaffirming the inherent power of the district
courts to levy sanctions); McCandless v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 697 F.2d 198, 199 (7th Cir.
1983) (trial court's interpretation of Roadway Express as applicable to willful abuse of judicial
process).
84. See Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 754. The case involved a sanction imposed upon three
lawyers who represented the plaintiffs in an employment discrimination suit. Id at 754-56. The
trial court had dismissed the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 for failure to com-
ply with discovery orders. Id at 755. The court, relying on 28 U.S.C. § 1927, also ordered the
plaintiffs' attorneys to pay the defendant's costs and attorney fees, a total of over $17,000. Id at
756. The court of appeals reversed the award of attorney fees, holding that section 1927 was
limited to court costs as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1920.
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals regarding section 1927, but remanded the
case to the district court for a determination of whether the plaintiffs' attorneys had acted in bad
faith. Id at 769. In doing so the Court held that parties and their attorneys could be compelled to
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terms possible-the inherent power of federal courts to tax attorney
fees against counsel who have abused the processes of the courts. The
only limitations placed on the power are that counsel must have shown
bad faith in the initiation or conduct of litigation and that the sanction
be imposed only after fair notice and an opportunity to be heard.86 It
thus appears clear that, under Roadway Express, a federal appeals court
has the inherent power to require counsel to pay the opposing party's
attorney fees as a sanction for initiating a frivolous appeal or for prose-
cuting an appeal in an abusive manner. Implicit in the opinion is the
principle that the bad faith of a party or attorney in the conduct of an
appeal can justify the court in dismissing the appeal as a sanction.
Notwithstanding the clear holding in Roadway Express, only once
has a federal appeals court relied upon the case as authority for the
imposition of a sanction against an attorney for filing a frivolous ap-
peal.87 This is probably because it is easier for a court to justify the
imposition of a sanction by relying on a statute or a rule rather than on
its inherent authority; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1912 and 1927 and Appellate Rule
3888 provide specific authority.
D. Circuit Rules.
Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 47 (Appellate Rule
47), each court of appeals is authorized to adopt circuit rules not incon-
sistent with the appellate rules.89 Because the existence of sections 1912
and 1927 and Appellate Rule 38 renders circuit rules on the subject of
pay costs and attorney fees as a sanction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b) for failure
to comply with discovery orders of the court. In addition, the Court discussed the inherent power
of a federal court to impose sanctions upon litigants and their attorneys. Id at 764-67.
The Court's reasoning relied upon the previously recognized inherent power of a court to levy
sanctions on a party for abusive litigation tactics. It cited Link v. Wabash Ry. Co., 370 U.S. 626,
632 (1962), as support for including the authority to dismiss a case for want of prosecution within
the inherent power. Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 765. The Court then noted that the bad faith
exception to the general rule against the award of attorney fees applied to the conduct of litigation
as well as to the initial bringing of an action. Id at 766. The Court concluded: "The power of a
court over members of its bar is at least as great as its authority over litigants. If a court may tax
counsel fees against a party who has litigated in bad faith, it certainly may assess those expenses
against counsel who willfully abuse judicial processes." Id at 766. The Court noted, however,
that attorney fees should not be assessed lightly or without fair notice and an opportunity to be
heard on the record. Id at 767.
85. Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 767.
86. Id at 766-67.
87. TIF Instruments, Inc. v. Colette, 713 F.2d 197, 201 (6th Cir. 1983) (attorney held liable
under Roadway Express for a portion of costs and attorney fees awarded under Appellate Rule 38
against client; the apportionment between client and attorney to be made by the trial court but
with counsel to pay at least one-half the amount awarded).
88. See supra notes 68-82 and accompanying text.
89. FED. R. App. P. 47.
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frivolous appeals unnecessary, only a few circuits have them.90 Fifth
Circuit Rule 42.2, Eighth Circuit Rule 12(a), and Eleventh Circuit Rule
18 each provide that if an appeal is found to be frivolous and entirely
without merit, it will be dismissed.91 They make no mention of other
sanctions.92 Sixth Circuit Rule 11(h), adopted in 1983, provides that
the court may deny costs to a party who adds unnecessary material to
the appendix.93 It further refers to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and provides that
any attorney who multiplies the proceedings so as to increase costs un-
reasonably and vexatiously may be required to pay the excess costs per-
sonally and may be subject to disciplinary sanctions. The language as
to excess costs is almost identical to the language of section 1927 before
the 1980 amendment. 94
E. Attorney Discipline.
In addition to the sanctions imposed under the various sources of
authority described above, each court of appeals can also impose sanc-
tions pursuant to its disciplinary authority over attorneys who practice
before it. This power is recognized by Appellate Rule 46.95 Under the
disciplinary authority, a court of appeals can impose suspension, dis-
barment, or less serious sanctions for the breach of rules.96 Taking a
single frivolous appeal is not likely to result in anything more than an
expression of disapproval in a court opinion or order, but a pattern of
frivolous appeals has been the basis for more severe discipline.97
90. Prior to Appellate Rule 38, however, sanctions were based in circuit rules. See supra
notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
91. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2; 8TH CIR. R. 2(a); I 1TH CIR. R. 18. For an application of Rule 42.2,
see McCoy v. Gordon, 709 F.2d 1060, 1062 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing rule as Fifth Circuit Rule 20).
Although the Second Circuit does not have a rule for frivolous appeals, it does have a rule taxing
a petition for rehearing that is wholly without merit, vexatious and for delay. 2D CIR. R. 40.
92. Eighth Circuit Rule 16(e), however, provides that if an attorney files a "frivolous petition
for rehearing in banc," the attorney will be found to have multiplied the proceedings and to have
increased costs unreasonably and vexatiously in the sum of $250 and that the attorney may be
required to pay personally that amount. The rule concludes with a reference to 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
93. 6TH CIR. R. 11(h).
94. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976) ("Any attorney ... who so multiplies the proceedings
in any case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to
satisfy personally such excess costs.") with 6TH CIR. R. 11 (h) ("[A]ny counsel who so multiplies the
proceedings in any case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the
court to satisfy personally such excess costs ... ").
95. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46 provides: "A court of appeals may, after reason-
able notice and an opportunity to show cause to the contrary, and after hearing, if requested, take
any appropriate disciplinary action against any attorney who practices before it .. ." See, e.g., In
re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319, 325 (1st Cir. 1973) (relying on Appellate Rule 46 to reprimand and fine
an attorney for filing frivolous appeals).
96. FED. R. App. P. 46 advisory committee note.
97. See infra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
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Courts of appeals have been reluctant, however, to exercise this disci-
plinary power to any great extent.98
V. TYPES OF SANCTIONS
At first glance, the range of sanctions for taking a frivolous appeal
appears to be quite broad. The most obvious sanction, of course, is
dismissal of the appeal or affirmance of the judgment. 99 This article is
concerned, however, with other types of sanctions that can be imposed
by an appellate court, specifically, monetary sanctions. The dismissal of
an appeal or the affirmance of a judgment because the appeal is frivo-
lous is not itself a sanction because a frivolous appeal necessarily will
be unsuccessful. The result is the same as if the court affirmed the
judgment but did not find the appeal to be frivolous. Dismissal or af-
firmance is not, consequently, a sanction in the sense used in this arti-
cle. Similarly, the award of single costs is not a sanction because under
Appellate Rule 39 the prevailing party is automatically entitled to re-
cover costs unless the court provides otherwise 0 The same is true of
the award of interest under Appellate Rule 37.101 A sanction for taking
a frivolous appeal as used here is some penalty imposed upon a party
or the party's attorney in addition to that which is ordinarily due when
a judgment is affirmed or the appeal dismissed.
A. Monetary Sanctions.
1. Double Costs. The most common type of monetary sanction
is the charging of double costs. 10 2 Both 28 U.S.C. § 1912 and Appellate
98. See infra note 136. For a discussion of attorneys' ethical obligations to appellate courts,
with particular discussion of disciplinary action under Appellate Rule 46(c) for filing unsubstanti-
ated appeals, see generally Seidenfeld, Professional Responsibility Before Reviewing Courts, 25
DEPAUL L. REv. 264, 282-85 (1976).
99. See, e.g., McCoy v. Gordon, 709 F.2d 1060, 1061 (5th Cir. 1983) (appeal dismissed as to
frivolous claims); Mancuso v. Indiana Harbor Belt RR., 568 F.2d 553, 554 (7th Cir. 1978) (appeal
dismissed because order appealed from not final); Dunscombe v. Sayle, 340 F.2d 311, 311 (5th
Cir.) (appeal dismissed as patently frivolous), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965).
100. See FED. R. App. P. 39.
101. See FED. R. App. P. 37.
102. See, e.g., Collins v. Amoco Prod. Co., 706 F.2d 1114, 1115 (11th Cir. 1983); Veenkant v.
Burdick, No. 82-1583 (6th Cir. May 4, 1983) (available Aug. 1, 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library,
Cir file); United States v. 1-12 Garden Apartments, 703 F.2d 900, 904 (5th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Hart, 701 F.2d 749, 749 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Potamkin Cadillac Corp., 697
F.2d 491, 494 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3128 (1983); General Brewing Co. v. Law Firm of
Gordon, Thomas, Honeywell, Malanca, Peterson & O'Hearn, 694 F.2d 190, 193 (9th Cir. 1982);
Van Arnem v. CIS Leasing Corp., Nos. 80-1258; 80-1275 (6th Cir. Jan. 5, 1982) (available Aug. 1,
1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir file). For other cases in which double costs were awarded,
see Seyler v. Seyler, 678 F.2d 29, 32 (5th Cir. 1982); Shuffman v. Hartford Textile Corp., 659 F.2d
299,306 (2d Cir. 1981); Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins., 651 F.2d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 1981); Watson
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Rule 38 expressly refer to this type of sanction, while 28 U.S.C. § 1927
refers to "excess costs."'10 3
The first question that arises is the definition of the term "costs" as
used in sections 1912 and 1927 and Appellate Rule 38. The United
States Supreme Court in Roadway Express' 4 construed section 1927 to
mean only costs as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1920.105 These costs include
clerk and marshal fees, disbursements, fees charged by the clerk for
copies of papers, docket fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1923, and compensa-
tion of court-appointed experts.' 0 6 The Court expressly held that the
term "costs" in section 1927 did not include attorney fees. 0 7
Appellate Rule 38 does not define "costs." Neither does Appellate
Rule 39.108 The latter rule, which deals exclusively with costs on ap-
peal, provides for the awarding of costs .to the prevailing party, and the
advisory committee note expressly refers to section 1920. Appellate
Rule 39 also authorizes the taxing of the cost of printing briefs, appen-
dices, and copies of records.' 0 9 The rule further lists certain costs on
appeal that are taxable in the district court, including costs incurred in
the preparation and transmission of the reporter's transcript, premiums
paid for appeal bonds, and the filing fee for the appeal." 0 Although
neither Appellate Rule 39 nor the advisory committee note refers to 28
U.S.C. § 1913, that section states that costs and fees to be charged and
collected in each court of appeals are to be established by the United
v. Callon Petroleum Co., 632 F.2d 646, 649 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Rayco, Inc., 616 F.2d
462, 464 (10th Cir. 1980); Ruderer v. Fine, 614 F.2d 1128, 1133 (7th Cir. 1980); Lowenshuss v.
Bluhdorn, 613 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); Libby, McNeill & Libby v.
City Nat'l Bank, 592 F.2d 504, 515 (9th Cir. 1978); Good Hope Ref., Inc. v. Brashear, 588 F.2d
846, 848 (Ist Cir. 1978); Der-Rong Chour v. INS, 578 F.2d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 980 (1979); Mancuso v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R., 568 F.2d 553, 554 (7th Cir. 1978);
Acevedo v. INS, 538 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1976); First Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Lynn, 525 F.2d 1, 3 (Ist
Cir. 1975); Simon & Flynn, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 513 F.2d 832, 835 (2d Cir. 1975); Clarion Corp. v.
American Home Prod. Corp., 494 F.2d 860, 866 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 419 U.S. 870 (1974);
Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 475 F.2d 766, 767 (9th Cir. 1973); Local 2, Int'l Bhd. of Tel.
Workers v. International Bhd. of Tel. Workers, 416 F.2d 414, 416 (1st Cir. 1969); Dunscombe v.
Sayle, 340 F.2d 311, 311 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965); Griffin Wellpoint Corp. v.
Munro-Langstroth, Inc., 269 F.2d 64, 68 (1st Cir. 1959); Lowe v. Willacy, 239 F.2d 179, 180 (9th
Cir. 1956).
103. See28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1982) ("may adjudge... just damages for his delay, and single or
double costs"); 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982) ("may be required ... to satisfy personally the excess
costs"); FED. R. App. P. 38 ("may award just damages and single or double costs").
104. 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
105. Id at 760.
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(1)-(6) (1982).
107. Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 762-63.
108. FED. R. App. P. 39(a) ("if a judgment is afflrned, costs shall be taxed against appellant
... ; if a judgment is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the appellee").
109. FED. R. App. P. 39(c).
110. FED. R. App. P. 39(e).
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States Judicial Conference."' The Conference periodically sets vari-
ous fees to be charged by the clerk. The fees include a docketing fee
and charges for copying or certifying court records. 12 In summary,
under sections 1912 and 1927 and Appellate Rule 38, costs are ascer-
tained by reference to 28 U.S.C. § 1920, Appellate Rule 39, and the
costs and fees established by the Judicial Conference pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1913.
The only costs likely to be significant are the cost of the transcript
and the cost of printing or photocopying the briefs and appendix. Be-
cause the appellant is the one who is primarily responsible for initially
ordering and paying for the transcript, as well as for preparing the ap-
pendix, it is unlikely that the award of double costs will penalize the
appellant or assist the appellee to any great extent.
2. Damages. Section 1912" 3 and Appellate Rule 38114 each
provide for damages as a sanction. Section 1927 does not expressly use
the term "damages" but the 1980 amendment to the statute provides
for the payment of "excess costs, expenses and attorneys fees.""15 Be-
cause these are the same types of items that are most often awarded as
damages, it is fair to say that damages can be awarded under section
1927 as well as section 1912 and Appellate Rule 38.
Neither the code sections nor the rule defines the term "damages."
Beginning with the adoption of a rule by the Supreme Court in 1803,
damages awarded for the delay caused by an appeal were limited to ten
percent per year of the amount of thb judgment and these damages
included interest." 6 The rule was later changed to call for damages at
the rate of ten percent of the amount of the judgment over and above
interest, and this rule remained in effect until 1980.'1 7 With the elimi-
nation of the ten percent figure," 8 the amount of damages to be
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1913 (1982).
112. See 28 U.S.C. § 1913 (1982) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees).
113. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
116. See supranote 81.
117. Id Many circuit rules in effect prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure in 1968 included provisions similar to the Supreme Court rule. See supra note 81. The
effect of these rules was to define the term "damages" as used in section 1912 to mean not more
than 10 percent of the judgment, although it was not clear whether the 10 percent could be cumu-
lative each year or was limited to a one-time calculation.
118. Neither the Supreme Court rule nor the circuit rules contain a reference to the specified
percentage. See supra notes 81-82. To compare the circuit rules before and after Appellate Rule
38 was adopted, see supra note 82 and notes 90-94.
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awarded as a sanction under sections 1912 and 1927 and Appellate
Rule 38 rests solely in the discretion of the appellate court.
The most common measure of damages used by the courts is the
award of attorney fees, usually limited to a maximum amount. t" 9 On
other occasions the assessment is simply a specific amount of money. 120
Upon declaring the appeal to be frivolous, appellate courts have also
remanded the question of the amount of the award to the trial court.' 2'
Several courts have awarded an additional percentage to be tacked on
to the usual interest allowed. 22 Unless attorney fees are awarded, the
amount of the damages is usually no more than several thousand
dollars.' 23
119. See, e.g., TIF Instruments, Inc. v. Collette, 713 F.2d 197, 201 (6th Cir. 1983) (awarding
costs and attorney fees; amount to be determined on remand); Standridge Flying Serv. v. Depart-
ment of Transp., 712 F.2d 1223, 1224-25 (8th Cir. 1983) (damages under Appellate Rule 38 of
costs and reasonable attorney fees); Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, 699 F.2d 484,
485 (9th Cir. 1983) (damages of $1,250 including costs and attorney fees), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
1445 (1984); United States v. Potamkin Cadillac Corp., 697 F.2d 491, 494-95 (2d Cir.) (double
costs and damages of $500 in attorney fees), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3128 (1983); General Brewing
Co. v. Law Firm of Gordon, Thomas, Honeywell, Malance, Peterson & O'Hearn, 694 F.2d 190,
193 (9th Cir. 1982) (damages in the amount of reasonable attorney fees); Seyler v. Seyler, 678 F.2d
29, 31 (5th Cir. 1982) (damages of reasonable attorney fees); Bankers Trust Co. v. Publicker In-
dus., 641 F.2d 1361, 1368 (2d Cir. 1981) (damages in sum of $10,000 or appelle's expenses, in-
cluding attorney fees, whichever is less); Bank of Canton v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 636 F.2d 30, 31
(2d Cir. 1980) (damages of $5,000 or expenses including counsel fees, whichever is less); Church of
Scientology v. McLean, 615 F.2d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 1980) (damages include reasonable attorney
fees); Libby, McNeil & Libby v. City Nat'l Bank, 592 F.2d 504, 515 (9th Cir. 1979) (damages of
reasonable attorney fees); Mancuso v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R., 568 F.2d 553, 554 (7th Cir. 1978)
(damages of $350 as attorney fees); Overmyer v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 554 F.2d 539, 543 (2d Cir.
1977) (damages of $2,000 in attorney fees); First Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Lynn, 525 F.2d 1, 3 (Ist Cir.
1975) (damages to the extent of the reasonable fees of the attorneys); Ginsburg v. Stern, 295 F.2d
698, 698 (3d Cir. 1961) (usual costs plus $500 for counsel fees and other expenses), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 987 (1962); Lowe v. Willacy, 239 F.2d 179, 180 (9th Cir. 1956) (just damages of double costs
and attorney fees).
120. See, e.g., Shuffman v. Hartford Textile Corp., 659 F.2d 299, 306 (2d Cir. 1981) ($5,000),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1018 (1982); Ruderer v. Fine, 614 F.2d 1128, 1133 (7th Cir. 1980) ($2,500);
Clarion Corp. v. American Home Prod. Corp., 494 F.2d 860, 866 (7th Cir.) ($2,500), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 870 (1974); Fluoro Elec. Corp. v. Branford Assoc., 489 F.2d 320, 326 (2d Cir. 1973)
($4,500).
121. See, eg., TIF Instruments, Inc. v. Collette, 713 F.2d 197, 201 (6th Cir. 1983); Ellingson v.
Burlington N., Inc., 653 F.2d 1327, 1332 (9th Cir. 1981); Self v. Self, 614 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir.
1980) (per curiam); Exhibitors Poster Exch., Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 543 F.2d 1106,
1107 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); Furbee v. Vantage Press, Inc., 464 F.2d 835,
838 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Eaton v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 459 F.2d 684, 686 (4th Cir.
1972).
122. See, e.g., Brady v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 740 F.2d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1984) (additional
three percent on judgment); Oscar Gruss & Son v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 422 F.2d
1278, 1285 (2d Cir. 1970) (additional four percent on judgment).
123. See supra note 120.
DUKE LAWJO URN4L
3. Attorney Fees. Under the "American Rule," the prevailing
party can not ordinarily recover attorney fees as a part of the costs
assessable against the losing party.1 24 As the Supreme Court pointed
out in Roadway Express,1 25 however, this rule does not apply when the
litigation is initiated or conducted in bad faith.126 Attorney fees can be
imposed as a sanction expressly under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, as damages
under 28 U.S.C. § 1912 and Appellate Rule 38, and under the court's
inherent authority as recognized in Roadway Express.127 Attorney fees
account for the largest monetary sanctions because, in most cases, they
are the largest finite amount the court can identify as damages flowing
from the taking of a frivolous appeal and can be ascertained with rela-
tive ease.
4. Fines. Occasionally a court will impose a monetary sanction
on a litigant or attorney and describe the sanction as a fine. 128 The
difference between a fine and damages, of course, is that a fine is paid
to the court while damages are paid to the appellee. The basis for fines
against an attorney is the court's disciplinary authority over attor-
neys.129 Presumably, the purpose of the fine is to compensate for the
harm done to other litigants or the public by wasting the court's time,
while the purpose of damages is to compensate the appellee for the
harm the delay has caused him.
5. Persons Assessed Monetary sanctions can be imposed on
either the litigant or the attorney. Both 28 U.S.C. § 1912 and Appellate
Rule 38 provide for the award of damages and costs to a party, but
neither specifies who is to pay the damages or costs-the party or his
counsel.130 Generally, however, when the courts hold attorneys liable
for a sanction, they cite 28 U.S.C. § 1927.131 That section is by its terms
applicable only to attorneys and others admitted to conduct cases
124. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (detailed
history of development of rule); McCandless v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 697 F.2d 198, 200 (7th
Cir. 1983).
125. 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
126. Id at 765-66.
127. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
128. See In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d at 325 (suspending attorney as member of the bar and
imposing fine of $500); see also Prossnitz, supra note 70, at 36.
129. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 68 and 75.
131. See, e.g., Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, 699 F.2d 484, 485 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1445 (1984); but see Asberry v. United States Postal Serv., 692 F.2d
1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (costs and fees assessed jointly and severally against appellant and his
attorney); Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 605 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir. 1978)
(attorney also one of the appellants).
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before federal courts.1 32 According to Roadway Express, both the ap-
pellant and the attorney may be ordered to pay the attorney fees of the
opposing party under the court's inherent authority. 33
B. Nonmonetary Sanctions.
The major nonmonetary sanction that can be imposed against a
party for taking- a frivolous appeal or for abusive tactics is to dismiss
the appeal or affm the judgment. 34 Dismissal or affirmance, how-
ever, is not considered a sanction for the taking of a frivolous appeal
because the result is no different from that in an appeal not found friv-
olous but in which the judgment is still affirmed. Dismissal or affirm-
ance is a major sanction, however, if it is based on the misconduct of
the party or the attorney and imposed on an otherwise legitimate ap-
peal. No court of appeals has dismissed an appeal for this reason, al-
though district courts dismiss cases for abusive tactics relating to
discovery.' 35 Courts of appeals have, however, initiated disciplinary
proceedings against attorneys who pursue frivolous appeals. 36 These
proceedings could result in the imposition of a monetary sanction, a
nonmonetary sanction, or both.137 Appellate courts have also censured
attorneys in judicial opinions, 38 and have warned that any similar con-
duct in the future would result in disciplinary action. 139 One court of
132. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982) ("attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases").
133. 447 U.S. at 766.
134. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Piher Int'l Corp., 59 F.R.D. 394, 395 (N.D. Il1. 1973) (citing FED-
ERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 37(b)(2)(C)).
136. See, e.g., Lowenschuss v. Bluhdorn, 613 F.2d 18, 19 (2d Cir.) (request to Pennsylvania
Bar Association to review attorneys' conduct), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); In re Bithoney,
486 F.2d 319, 319 (1st Cir. 1973) (disciplinary proceedings in response to court's request in
Panagopoulos v. INS, 434 F.2d 602, 604 (1st Cir. 1970)).
137. See In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319, 325 (1st Cir. 1973) (suspension and imposition of fine).
138. See, eg., United States v. Potamkin Cadillac Corp., 697 F.2d 491,495 (2d Cir.) (attorney
"has unduly delayed the termination of this litigation and has caused the proceedings to be unrea-
sonably and vexatiously multiplied"), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3128 (1983); Shuffinan v. Hartford
Textile Corp., 659 F.2d 299, 305 (2d Cir. 1981) ("the attorney who is responsible for the unreason-
able prolongation of this litigation"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1018 (1982); Lowenschuss v. Bluhdorn,
613 F.2d 18, 20 (2d Cir.) ("culmination of pattern of highly improper conduct on his [attorney's]
part"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); Der-Rong Chour v. INS, 578 F.2d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1978)
("double costs are assessed petitioner and his attorney"), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 980 (1979);
Acevedo v. INS, 538 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1976) ("petitioner's attorney who is responsible for the
unreasonable prolongation of this litigation"); cf. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 2 Ct.
Cl. 255, 262 (1983) ("Attorneys ... have violated their responsibilities as members of the bar [and
for] this misconduct they are publicly reprimanded."). See also Flaherty v. Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d
637, 651-54, 646 P.2d 179, 188-90, 183 Cal. Rptr. 508, 517-19 (1982) (discussing public censure for
frivolous appeals and the need for due process).
139. See, e.g., Watson v. Callon Petroleum Co., 632 F.2d 646, 649 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[We] trust
that our message is understood."); Comora v. Security Title Ins. Co., 614 F.2d 683, 684 (9th Cir.
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appeals has enjoined a litigant from bringing bad faith law suits and
appeals that raise unoriginal issues.' 40
VI. ANALYSIS
A. Confusion Over Defining Frivolous Appeals and Determining
When To Impose a Sanction.
The courts of appeals have often confused two distinct issues. The
first issue is whether an appeal should be classified as frivolous because
of its lack of merit. 14' The second issue is whether, given that an ap-
peal is frivolous on its merits, the conduct of the appellant or the attor-
ney is such that a sanction should be imposed on one or both. 4 2 Often
courts determine that an appeal is frivolous by examining the conduct
of the appellant or attorney, rather than by looking at the merits of the
appeal.' 43 This conduct is then used as the basis for determining the
necessity for the sanction and the type to be imposed. 144 This approach
causes the courts to vacillate between objective and subjective stan-
dards and obscures the extent to which the intent of the appellant or
the attorney determines whether an appeal is frivolous.
Even though an appeal does have some merit, it may still be frivo-
lous if the appellant's conduct indicates that his primary purpose is to
delay enforcement of the judgment, to cause the appellee to incur un-
necessary expense, to be vexatious, or if the conduct otherwise demon-
strates bad faith by abuse of the judicial process. There is no case in
which a court has found that an appeal had merit and yet was con-
ducted in such a way as to call for a frivolous appeal sanction. What
the courts have done, however, is to look at the conduct of the appel-
lant as evidence of whether the appeal is without merit and thus frivo-
lous. 145 This type of analysis creates confusion. A frivolous appeal
should be one that has no merit when viewed objectively and should
not be defined by the beliefs or intent of the appellant or attorney.
1980) ("[A]ppellant should note that it would be unlikely that we would be so constrained if he
attempts, once again, to relitigate these issues."); Overmyer v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 554 F.2d
539, 543 n.4 (2d Cir. 1977) ("We will not countenance further attempts to pervert the federal
judicial process into a Dickensian Court where lawsuits never end.").
140. See Green v. Warden, 699 F.2d 364, 367-70 (7th Cir.) (court issues injunction under the
All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), against prisoner's abuse ofjudicial system), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 2436 (1983). See also Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 605 F.2d 35, 38
(2d Cir. 1978) (court upheld district judge's permanent injunction against "further harassing liti-
gation" against the defendants).
141. See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.






This does not mean, however, that the conduct of the appellant or
the attorney is irrelevant to the frivolous appeal sanction. What it does
mean is that the conduct is significant for another purpose-to deter-
mine the nature and extent of the sanction to be imposed. This is the
real reason the courts look to the conduct and the intent it demon-
strates. The more flagrant the conduct, the clearer it is that the intent
or motive of the person is culpable and the larger the sanction should
be. Thus, the conduct or intent should be the measure of the sanction,
not the measure of the merit of the appeal.
If the appeal is found to have some merit when viewed objectively,
does this mean that the conduct or intent of the party or attorney then
becomes irrelevant? Clearly not. Roadway Express 46 has established
beyond question that a party or attorney who abuses the judicial pro-
cess by conducting litigation in bad faith has engaged in conduct that
justifies the imposition of some type of sanction, either monetary or
nonmonetary, without regard to the underlying merit of the lawsuit.147
At the trial level, the recent amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 11 goes beyond Roadway Express and provides for monetary or
nonmonetary sanctions-against the litigant, the attorney, or both-for
the filing of any pleading, motion, or other paper in court that does not
meet the standard set forth in Rule 11.148 Under that rule, signing a
document filed in court certifies that it is "well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law and that it is not interposed for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay
or needless increase in the cost of litigation."' 49 Each document must
meet a dual standard; it must have merit and must not be filed for an
improper purpose. A violation of either standard is grounds for a sanc-
tion. The amended rule also deletes the wilfulness requirement of the
old rule, so that all that need be shown to justify the sanction is a fail-
ure to comply with the rule.' 50 The extent of the sanction will, of
146. 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
147. Id at 766.
148. If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court,
upon motion or upon its initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a repre-
sented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the
other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the
filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See Comment, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HoFsTrA L. REV. 997 (1983).
149. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
150. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 formerly read: "For a wilfulviolation of this rule an
attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C.A.
(West 1960) (emphasis added). The amended rule now reads: "If a pleading . . . is signed in
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course, depend upon the nature of the conduct involved. Similar provi-
sions were added to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16151 and 25.152
B. Sources of Authority.
When imposing sanctions for frivolous appeals, courts often fail to
specify whether they are relying on a section of the United States Code,
Appellate Rule 38, a circuit rule, the court's inherent authority, or some
combination of these. Part of the problem is that the courts have no
uniform procedure for considering the question of sanctions and usu-
ally discuss them only at the end of the opinion on the merits. The
problem is particularly acute when the court is acting sua sponte rather
than in response to a motion filed by the appellee, because a motion or
supporting memorandum will likely cite a statute or rule as the basis
for the motion. Another difficulty is that 28 U.S.C. § 1912 and Appel-
late Rule 38 are essentially duplicative and the courts will often refer to
one or the other or both without discussing the relationship between
them. The courts leave unresolved the issues whether section 1912 and
Appellate Rule 38 authorize the imposition of a sanction against only
the appellant, whether the attorney can be liable under that section or
rule, or whether the attorney can be liable under section 1927 or the
court's inherent authority. Further complications include whether sec-
tion 1912 and Appellate Rule 38 require a showing of delay. 53 An-
other unresolved question is whether the court can require that the
sanction be paid to the court, thus giving it the characteristics of a
fine. 154
These problems and others stem primarily from the fact that sec-
tions 1912 and 1927 of the Judicial Code were developed separately
and had different purposes. 55 Section 1912 was intended to remedy
injury to the appellee resulting from the delay caused by an appeal,
while section 1927 was concerned with abuse of the judicial process by
violation of this rule, the court. . . shall impose upon the person... an appropriate sanction
. ... FED. R. Crv. P. 11.
151. "In lieu of or in addition to any other sanction, the judge shall require the party or the
attorney representing him or both to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any non-
compliance with this rule including attorney's fees. . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (emphasis added).
152. "If certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certification, the party on whose behalf the
request, response, or objection is made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an
order to pay the amount of the reasonable expense incurred because of the violation, including a
reasonable attorney's fee." FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
153. See supra notes 68-69, 75-82 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 113-23, 128-29 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
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attorneys, primarily at the trial level. 156 The Supreme Court rules prior
to 1980 and the circuit rules based on them were drafted to limit the
damages that could be awarded under section 1912.157 Appellate Rule
38, although it appears to be a grant of power, is simply a replication of
section 1912 and does not establish any enforcement procedure. 58 The
advisory committee note to Appellate Rule 38 includes a cross refer-
ence only to section 1912 and not to section 1927 and thus it is unclear
whether there is any relationship between the two.
C. Procedure for Imposing Sanctions.
Courts seldom consider whether any special procedural require-
ments must be met in order to impose a sanction for a frivolous appeal.
The impetus of the sanction can come from either the appellee or the
appellate court itself.'59 If the appellee initiates the process, the appel-
lant or his attorney then has an opportunity to respond to the motion
prior to the court's decision. Under this procedure the appellant is ac-
corded the basic due process of notice and opportunity to be heard.
The same is not true, however, if the court first raises the question of a
sanction against the appellant or his attorney. 60 In these cases the first
time that the offending person discovers the possibility of a sanction is
when the court files its opinion imposing the sanction. The appellant
or attorney in such a case has neither notice nor opportunity to be
heard prior to the imposition of the sanction.
Given the fundamental due process requirements of notice and the
opportunity to be heard, it is surprising that there are only three in-
stances in which procedure has been discussed-in a United States
Supreme Court opinion,' 6' a congressional committee report, 62 and an
opinion of the California Supreme Court. 163 Although the courts of
156. See id.
157. See supra notes 80-82.
158. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
159. For party motions, see, for example, Watson v. Callon Petroleum Co., 632 F.2d 646, 648
(5th Cir. 1980); Fluoro Elec. Corp. v. Branford Assocs., 489 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir. 1973). For
courts raising sanctions sua sponte, see Van Arnem Co. v. CIS Leasing Corp., No. 80-1258, No.
80-1275 (6th Cir. Jan. 5, 1982) (available Aug. 1, 1983 on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir file); McCoy
v. Gordon, 709 F.2d 1060, 1061 (5th Cir. 1983); Ruderer v. Fines, 614 F.2d 1128, 1132 (7th Cir.
1980); Clarion Corp. v. American Home Prod. Corp., 494 F.2d 860, 865 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 870 (1974).
160. See Flaherty v. Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637, 652, 646 P.2d 179, 188-89, 183 Cal. Rptr. 508,
517-18 (1982) (finding merit in appellant's claim that his due process rights were violated when he
was fined by the court sua sponte for a frivolous appeal without notice and a hearing).
161. See infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
162. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
163. See infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
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appeals have discussed procedural requirements in relation to the im-
position of sanctions by district courts, they have not discussed the pro-
cedures necessary in the appellate courts. 64
In Roadway Express, the United States Supreme Court, holding
that a federal court had the inherent power to require counsel to pay
the attorney fees of opposing parties when counsel has "abused the
processes of the courts," stated that such a sanction could be imposed
only after fair notice and an opportunity to be heard have been pro-
vided.165 The decision, of course, was directed at the exercise of a dis-
trict court's inherent power over attorneys, 166 and thus may not directly
control the exercise of a court of appeals' power under a statute or rule.
There is no suggestion in the Roadway Express opinion, however, that a
lesser requirement might be applicable in an appellate court.
After the Roadway Express decision, Congress amended 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927 to include attorney fees among the items that could be assessed
against counsel pursuant to that section. 67 The report of the confer-
ence committee managers, specifically addressing the issue of what pro-
cedures should be followed in imposing a sanction under the section,
stated: "The managers intend that judges applying section 1927 will
safeguard the rights of an attorney who may be held in violation of the
section. Before sanctioning an attorney under section 1927, the court is
to afford the attorney all appropriate protections of due process avail-
able under the law."'168 The report, however, did not spell out what
these appropriate due process protections were to include.
The California Supreme Court, in Flaherty v. Flaherty, reviewed
an appellate court's summary imposition of a $500 fine against an at-
164. For a discussion of district court procedures, see, for example, Textor v. Board of Re-
gents, 711 F.2d 1387, 1395 (7th Cir. 1983) (subsequent hearing at which attorney bore burden of
proving that the award was not justified did not cure defect of no prior hearing); United States v.
Blodgett, 709 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1983) (in order to impose a sanction against conduct which
occurred outside presence of district court, the court must give counsel the opportunity to explain
conduct); cf Knorr Brake Corp. v. Harbil, Inc., 738 F.2d 223, 227-28 (7th Cir. 1984) andMiranda
v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 710 F.2d 516, 522 (9th Cir. 1983) (sanctions should not be imposed
by trial court without procedural protections).
The issue of appellate court procedures was raised in an opinion dissenting to the imposition
of a sanction under section 1927, but was not discussed in the majority opinion. See Malhiot v.
Southern California Retail Clerks Union, 735 F.2d 1133, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 1984) (Boochever, J.
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165. Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 766-67.
166. Id at 765-66.
167. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982).




torney for filing a frivolous appeal. 69 The court reversed the imposi-
tion of the fine and held that "[f]undamental constitutional mandates
require that the basic protections of due process be followed before an
attorney is fined for prosecuting a frivolous appeal. . . .Constitutional
due process principles are offended by the summary imposition of sanc-
tions by the appellate courts."' 170 The court went on to define what
process was due in the type of case before it, concluding that before a
sanction can be imposed against an attorney for filing a frivolous ap-
peal, the court must give the attorney fair warning and an opportunity
to respond, and then hold a hearing. 17' If a sanction is imposed, a writ-
ten statement of reasons for the penalty must also be given. 172
This inquiry raises several discrete questions: (1) whether the re-
quired notice must precede the imposition of the sanction; (2) whether
the opportunity to be heard must include an oral hearing; and (3)
whether an attorney may receive fewer procedural due process safe-
guards than a litigant receives.
The Supreme Court has stated that the "root" requirement of due
process is the right to be heard, and that the right to be heard depends
upon adequate notice of the right.173 An appellate court considering a
sanction sua sponte could be required, for example, to notify the appel-
lant by an order to show cause, which would serve the same function as
a motion filed by the appellee. Although there are arguments that prior
notice is not necessary before imposing a sanction for a frivolous ap-
peal, 74 failure to afford prior notice would seem to violate Roadway
169. Flaherty v. Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637, 645, 646 P.2d 179, 184, 183 Cal. Rptr. 508, 513
(1982).
170. Id at 652, 646 P.2d at 188-89, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 517-18.
171. Id at 654, 646 P.2d at 190, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
172. Id In a separate opinion, one justice said that due process in many cases would require
only an opportunity to file a written argument, and that an oral hearing was not always required.
Id at 654, 646 P.2d at 190, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 519 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
173. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) ("The fundamental requirement
of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful man-
ner.'") (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
174. There are two arguments that prior notice is not necessary. One is that sections 1912 and
1927 and Appellate Rule 38 themselves give notice that a sanction is possible and the court is
merely enforcing the statute or rule. The existence of the statute or rule, however, does not elimi-
nate the necessity for notice of an enforcement effort; it serves, rather, as the basis for the enforce-
ment action. It has also been suggested that because of the opportunity to seek reconsideration of
the sanction imposed by the appellate court, notice is provided by the opinion or order imposing
the sanction, and an opportunity to be heard is provided by a motion for reconsideration with
supporting memorandum. Again, this reasoning is not very convincing. The opportunity to per-
suade a court not to impose a sanction can hardly be said to be the procedural equivalent of
persuading a court to rescind its action. The former is much more likely to result in a court
approaching the issue with an open mind.
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The courts have provided no uniform definition of a hearing, and
have emphasized that the type of hearing required will vary from case
to case. 176 Courts seldom discuss whether an oral hearing is necessary
when a motion is made in the appellate court.17 7 The oral argument on
the merits is the only oral portion of the appellate process, and in many
cases even the merits are decided on the basis of briefs with no oral
argument. 178 Various motions are uniformly made and acted upon
without an oral hearing. Appellate Rule 27, which governs motions in
the courts of appeals, does not require an oral hearing on any type of
motion, substantive or procedural. 79 Consequently, there does not ap-
pear to be any more reason to require an oral hearing on a motion for a
frivolous appeal sanction than on any other type of motion.180
An attorney is expressly subject to sanctions under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927 and Appellate Rule 46 and has been held liable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1912,181 Appellate Rule 38,182 and the court's inherent authority. 83
175. Prior notice is required only when the court is considering a sanction. The court is not
required to notify the appellant before finding that an appeal is frivolous, because that determina-
tion is based on the court's assessment of the record. The appellant has already had an opportu-
nity to convince the court of the merits of his appeal through briefs and oral argument.
176. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (specific dictates of due pro-
cess require considerations of three factors: private interest affected, risk of erroneous deprivation
through procedures used, and fiscal and administrative burden of additional procedural
requirement).
177. See Flaherty v. Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637, 654-55, 646 P.2d 179, 190, 183 Cal. Rptr. 508,
519 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[Tjoo many judges still fail to think
in terms of possibly requiring notice and opportunity for informal response."). In all of the cases
in which federal courts of appeals have considered sanctions for frivolous appeals, the necessity
for an oral hearing has never been raised. When the United States Supreme Court in 1983 im-
posed for the first time in many years a monetary sanction for the taking of a frivolous appeal, it
did so without hearing oral argument on the issue. SeeTatum v. Regents, 103 S. Ct. 3084 (1983).
178. See R. MARTINEAU, supra note 4, at § 12.2.
179. FED. R. App. P. 27.
180. The type of evidence examined by the appellate court when it considers whether an ap-
peal is frivolous is another factor suggesting that an oral hearing is unnecessary. Such a hearing
does not serve a fact-finding function; the court looks only at the record in the case before it and at
other cases in which the appellant or attorney was involved. These are matters of which the court
can take judicial notice. The court itself is the best judge of whether the appeal is legally frivo-
lous, and the appellant already has had an opportunity to demonstrate his view of the legal merits
of the appeal. When the court considers whether the appeal was conducted in bad faith, it again
examines only the record, and the only issue to be resolved is the inferences to be drawn from that
record. The appellant can state his side of the argument in a written document just as well as he
can in oral argument.
181. See United States v. Potamkin Cadillac Corp., 697 F.2d 491, 494 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 3128 (1983).
182. See Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 699 F.2d 484, 485 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1445 (1984).
183. See Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 764-67 (1980); see also supra note 88.
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The attorney, because of his admission to practice in the court, has a
different relationship to the court than does a litigant. The Supreme
Court cases on point suggest that an attorney in a disciplinary proceed-
ing, despite this special relationship, is entitled to the same basic due
process protections as a layman. 184 Appellate Rule 46(c) requires that
before a federal court of appeals can take disciplinary action against an
attorney for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar, for failure to
comply with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, or for violating
any court rule, the court must give the attorney notice, an opportunity
to show cause, and a hearing if requested. 185 Both Appellate Rule
46(b), 186 governing suspension or disbarment, and Appellate Rule 46(c)
distinguish between responding in writing to an order to show cause
and requesting a hearing. This suggests that a "hearing" as used in
these rules refers to an oral hearing. However, when a court imposes a
monetary sanction under sections 1912 or 1927, Appellate Rule 38, or
the court's inherent authority, it is not acting pursuant to Appellate
Rule 46. Therefore, it does not appear that the requirements of Appel-
late Rule 46 would apply. 187 Due process does require at the very least
that the court notify, by means of an order to show cause, the person
against whom it is considering imposing a sanction.188
184. See Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 767 (sanctions against attorneys "should not be as-
sessed lightly or without fair notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the record"); In re Ruf-
falo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968) (lawyer charged with misconduct in disbarment proceeding is
entitled to procedural due process, which includes fair notice). See Martineau, The Supreme Court
and State Regulation of the Legal Profession, 8 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 199, 216-20, 241-43 (1981).
185. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(c) provides: "A court of appeals may, after rea-
sonable notice and an opportunity to show cause to the contrary, and after hearing, if requested
take any appropriate disciplinary action .... "
186. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(b) provides: "The member shall be afforded an
opportunity to show good cause .... Upon his response to the rule to show cause, and after
hearing, if requested... the court shall enter an appropriate order."
187. Even if an oral hearing is required, it need not be before a panel of the appellate court. It
would be counterproductive for judges to spend time conducting hearings on whether to impose a
frivolous appeal sanction when one of the purposes of the sanction is to save judges time by
discouraging frivolous appeals. If a hearing is necessary, there is no reason why it could not be
conducted by the circuit executive, clerk, or some other member of the staff of the court of ap-
peals. The staff member could develop a record, hear any evidence or explanation of the appel-
lant or attorney, and make recommendations to a panel of the court that would then decide
whether to impose a sanction and the amount.
188. See Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 767 n.14. However, the Court noted that "[t]he due
process concerns posed by an outright dismissal are plainly greater than those presented by assess-
ing counsel fees against lawyers." Id
This procedure should not delay rendition of a judgment on the merits of the appeal. If the
sanction is imposed after the mandate is issued, the sanction can be imposed by separate order or




Before discussing the specifics of any proposal, one must consider
whether the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure may authorize a
court of appeals to impose a sanction and establish the range of sanc-
tions for frivolous appeals. If the imposition of a sanction for filing a
frivolous appeal or for abusing the appeal process abridges or modifies
a substantive right, it is beyond the rulemaking power granted by the
Rules Enabling Act.189 It cannot be argued, however, that any effort to
penalize the exercise of the right to appeal is an abridgement of the Act
and thus can be authorized only by another statute. The imposition of
a sanction does not abridge the right to appeal any more than do other
rules that put limits on the exercise of statutory rights. 190 More impor-
tantly, a court of appeals does have the power to dismiss an appeal it
finds to be frivolous. 19 Under the rationale of Roadway Express, if a
court can dismiss an appeal because it is frivolous, it can impose a
sanction for the same reason. 92
Further, if the court can impose a sanction under its inherent au-
thority, the same matter can be regulated by the appellate rules. The
Supreme Court, in its new Rule 49.2, expressly gives itself the authority
to impose a sanction for a frivolous appeal. 193 Present Appellate Rule
38, although its title refers to damages for delay, is phrased in terms of
"frivolous appeal" rather than in terms of delay. 94 Both of these rules
are clear precedent for the proposition that a rule authorizing the impo-
sition of a sanction for taking a frivolous appeal does not contravene
the Rules Enabling Act. 95 More importantly, the subject of regula-
189. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982) ("[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substan-
tive right").
190. In fact, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure themselves limit the right to appeal.
See, e.g., FED. R. App. P. 4 (in civil cases, notices of appeals of right must be filed within 30 days
after entry of the order or judgment).
191. See supra note 99.
192. Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 765. The Court cited its decision in Link v. Wabash Ry.
Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962), for the proposition that courts have the inherent power to dismiss. Since
the assessment of monetary sanctions is less severe than outright dismissal, the court reasoned that
Link also supported the authority of courts to impose those sanctions. Roadway Express, 447 U.S.
at 765.
193. Sup. CT. R. 49.2 ("When an appeal or petition for writ of certiorari is frivolous, the Court
may award the appellee or the respondent appropriate damages.").
194. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
195. There is even less validity to the argument that a substantive right is abridged when a
litigant or attorney is penalized for abusing the appellate process by filing motions or other docu-
ments in bad faith or for some motive other than to prosecute the appeal. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11, as recently amended, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 both authorize the use
of sanctions for acts of commission or omission that interfere with the normal functioning of the
judicial process in the district court. The Supreme Court has upheld the validity of the Federal
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tions governing the use of sanctions is a matter that appears more ap-
propriate for appellate rules than for a statute, because the use of
sanctions for these purposes by the courts is essentially a matter of self-
protection. The judicial power has long been thought to include the
power of the courts to protect themselves from any attempts to interfere
with the proper functioning of the courts and the judicial process. 196
The necessity for self-protection is the basis for the concept of inherent
power.
There may be some concern that the deterrent effect of a sanction
will discourage the good faith appellant or attorney from filing a legiti-
mate appeal or motion. 97 This is, at most, a theoretical problem. The
first Congress, which established the right to appeal every final judg-
ment, recognized that the right could be abused and that monetary
sanctions were an appropriate vehicle for deterring that abuse.198 The
history of the use of sanctions by appellate courts does not suggest that
the courts will misuse or overuse this authority. 199 If anything, the rec-
ord demonstrates that the threat of sanctions has had minimal effect
because the courts have been so reluctant to use them.
Because of the problems associated with the current piecemeal ap-
proach to frivolous appeals, 2z° a single new statute or rule should be
established as the exclusive basis for sanctioning frivolous appellate
conduct. A rule that attempts to reduce both the number of meritless
appeals and abusive tactics should deal with four main areas: (1) frivo-
lous appeals; (2) abusive appeal tactics; (3) the range of sanctions; and
(4) procedures for initiating consideration of a sanction.20'
A. Frivolous Appeals.
The first section of an amended Appellate Rule 38 should simply
authorize the imposition of a sanction for the taking of a frivolous ap-
Rule of Civil Procedure 37 sanction, see Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 763-64; National Hockey
League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976), and it is likely that Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11 will also be approved.
196. See Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 765-67; Link v. Wabash Ry. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-32
(1962) (inherent power allows court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution).
197. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
201. Appellate Rule 38 is the logical basis for frivolous appeals sanctions, and should be
amended to address these areas. Section 1912 should be repealed, but section 1927 should be




peal.202 The first section should not attempt to define precisely a frivo-
lous appeal, but should simply state that it is an appeal with no
reasonable legal or factual basis. A frivolous appeal must meet some
objective standard, but that standard is best left to the courts to address
on a case-by-case basis. The standard applied should be objective and
not subjective; issues of a subjective nature, such as the intent of the
appellant, are relevant only to the sanction to be imposed.
Statutes and rules may be stated in mandatory or permissive
terms. The recent revision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 di-
rects, rather than authorizes, the district court to levy a sanction for
filing a paper in violation of the rule.20 3 The advisory committee note
to the amended rule states that this choice was made to "focus the
court's attention on the need to impose sanctions for pleading and mo-
tion abuses.' 204 The note acknowledges, however, that the court "re-
tains the necessary flexibility to deal appropriately with violations of
the rule. It has discretion to tailor sanctions to the particular facts of
the case . . -.1o5 In other words, the imposition of the sanction is
mandatory; the type and size of the sanction is discretionary. This
same philosophy should be followed when imposing a sanction for tak-
ing a frivolous appeal.
The bad faith of the appellant, as demonstrated by his conduct at
the trial, on appeal, and in prior or other pending litigation, becomes
significant only when the court considers the type of sanctions to be
imposed,20 6 and should not be used to determine whether the appeal is
frivolous in the first place.
The rule should apply to attorneys as well as to parties. The attor-
ney, rather than the party, may be the principal actor in taking the
appeal. Attorneys are expressly the subject of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and
have also been held liable when sanctions are imposed under other
sources of authority.20 7 Again, revised Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11, which provides for the imposition of a sanction upon a party, the
attorney or both, is the model for the appellate rule.20 8 It will be up to
the court to ascertain who, in any particular case, is the person at fault.
202. There is no need to list or describe here the range of sanctions. See infra notes 217-22 and
accompanying text.
203. "If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court...
shall impose. . . an appropriate sanction. ... FED. R. Civ. P. I1 (emphasis added).
204. FED. R. Civ. P. I 1 advisory committee note.
205. Id
206. See supra notes 38-52 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
208. "[T]he court. . . shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or
both, an appropriate sanction...." FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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The rule should include a reference to initiating a proceeding as
well as to taking an appeal. In a court of appeals, parties often file
petitions for supervisory writs as a substitute for appeal.20 9 These pro-
ceedings can be frivolous in the same way as an appeal and thus should
be included in the section. Furthermore, if a legitimate appeal becomes
frivolous as a result of later developments, 210 continuing the appeal
should also be sanctioned.
The first section of the rule should read:
(a) A court of appeals shall impose a sanction upon a party or attor-
ney or both for taking or continuing an appeal or initiating a pro-
ceeding in the court that the court finds to be frivolous. For purposes
of this rule, a frivolous appeal is one that has no reasonable legal or
factual basis.
B. Abusive Appeal Tactics.
The fact that appellants and their attorneys abuse the appellate
process by various tactics has long been recognized.211 When these tac-
tics are used in connection with an appeal that can be objectively de-
fined as frivolous, the tactics used on the appeal are relevant in
determining the sanction imposed for taking the frivolous appeal.212 If
an appeal does in fact have some merit and thus cannot properly be
classified as frivolous, it does not follow that a sanction cannot or
should not be imposed for the improper conduct. This is the thrust of
28 U.S.C. § 1927, but that section applies only to attorneys and not to
parties.213 It is also the thrust of the Roadway Express decision. 214
Some courts, in an effort to penalize this type of conduct, use the con-
duct to conclude that an appeal is frivolous. This confusion can best be
avoided by including in an appellate rule a provision similar to
amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such a pro-
vision would make it clear that whether or not an appeal is found to be
frivolous, abusive appeal tactics should be penalized.
The appellate rule should contain the same elements as does
amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11; the imposition of the
209. See R. MARTINEAU, supra note 4, at § 19.1.
210. If, during the pendency of an appeal, there is a retroactive change in the relevant law,
adverse to the appellant, continuing the appeal may be frivolous. Cf. Christiansburg Gan-nent
Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S 412, 422 (1978) (a plaintiff can be assessed his opponent's attorney fees if"a
court finds that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff contin-
ued to litigate after it clearly became so"). See also Seegull Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 735 F.2d 971, 974
(6th Cir. 1984).
211. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 141-52 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
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sanction should be mandatory, but the type and size of the sanction
should be within the discretion of the judge. A paper filed in court
should be signed by the person filing it, with the signature constituting
a certification that the paper is supported by the facts, by existing law,
or by a good faith argument for changing the law, and that the paper is
not filed for an improper purpose such as delay, harassment, or a need-
less increase in the cost of litigation.
The language of the section should be virtually identical to that of
Rule 11, so that the same type of improper conduct will receive equal
treatment in the court of appeals and in the district court. Cases inter-
preting one rule may serve as precedent for interpretations of the other.
One difference between Rule 11 and the new appellate rule should
be the separation of the requirement that papers be signed from the
directive for the imposition of a sanction. Because present Appellate
Rule 25 already deals with filing and service of papers,215 adding the
signature requirement and its status as a certification in Rule 25(a) with
a cross reference to Appellate Rule 38, where the penalty for filing a
paper in violation of the certification is stated, is preferable.
The new language of Appellate Rule 25 should read:
(a) A party or attorney who files a paper in a proceeding conducted
pursuant to these rules shall sign the paper. The signature of the
party or attorney or the filing of a paper without a signature consti-
tutes a certification that: the document is well grounded in fact; is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law; and is not filed for an im-
proper purpose such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of the litigation. A party or attorney
who files a paper in violation of this rule, or the party on whose be-
half the paper is filed, is subject to a sanction in accordance with
Rule 38.
Moreover, unlike Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, the new ap-
pellate rules would apply to conduct beyond the filing of papers. Al-
though that is the type of activity most likely to fall within the meaning
of "abusive appeal tactic," it is not necessarily the only abusive tactic.
The new Rule should also sanction the failure to file or the late filing of
a paper such as a record or brief; failure to order the transcript in a
timely manner; failure to appear for a settlement conference or oral
argument; a dilatory response to an order or request from the court or a
request from the other party; or any act of commission or omission that
has the same improper purposes mentioned in Rule 11--delay, harass-
215. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 25 is entitled "Filing and Service." It has four




ment, or causing needless expense.216 Consequently, the appellate rule
must include a general reference to any abusive appeal tactic which
would include, but not be limited to, filing a paper with an improper
purpose.
The new section to be added to Appellate Rule 38 should read:
(b) A court of appeals shall impose a sanction upon a party or attor-
ney or both for filing a paper in violation of Rule 25(a) or for any act
of commission or omission that has an improper purpose such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost
of litigation.
C. Available Sanctions.
The section on sanctions should, to the extent possible, give flexi-
bility to the court while at the same time giving some advance warning
to litigants and attorneys. This can best be achieved by listing the most
common types of sanctions, but allowing the court to fashion a differ-
ent sanction when appropriate.21 7
One sanction that should be included is the power to dismiss the
appeal. Although dismissal is not actually a sanction for a frivolous
appeal,2 18 a dismissal will not necessarily occur in a case of abusive
tactics absent its use as a sanction. The inclusion of dismissal as a sanc-
tion for abusive tactics is supported by Roadway Express219 and by its
customary use as a sanction for discovery abuses pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 37.220
Fines payable to the court are not included as a sanction in any
present statute or rule. Monetary sanctions have been used by the
courts of appeals as a means of compensating the opposing party for
the delay or additional expense caused by the appellant or his attor-
ney.22' The court itself, however, may have been put to additional ex-
pense because of the conduct of a party or attorney even though the
opposing party has not been directly harmed. It may also be that the
216. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
217. This approach represents a compromise between providing an exclusive list of sanctions
and leaving the question of sanctions entirely to the discretion of the courts. Both approaches
have precedent in existing law. Appellate Rule 38, 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1982), and Supreme Court
Rule 49.2 each lists damages as a sanction, and Appellate Rule 38 and section 1912 also allow
double costs. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. On the other hand, the new Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure I 1 leaves the entire matter to the discretion of the court, providing that
"the court ... shall impose. . . an appropriate sanction ....
218. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
219. 447 U.S. at 754. See supra note 84.
220. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Piher Int'l Corp., 59 F.R.D. 394, 395 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (citing FED.
R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C)).
221. See supra notes 15 and 16.
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harm is borne primarily by other litigants who suffer delay in the dis-
position of their cases. In those situations, deterrence is the principal
reason for a sanction,22 2 and a fine payable to the court rather than
damages payable to the opposing party is the most appropriate
sanction.
The third section of Appellate Rule 38 should read:
(c) A court of appeals may impose one or more of the following
sanctions:
(1) dismissal of the appeal;
(2) striking a paper, pleading or motion;
(3) a monetary sanction including but not limited to (i) double
costs, (ii) a penalty not to exceed ten percent of the judg-
ment, (iii) damages occasioned by delay, (iv) reasonable at-
torney fees, (v) a fine payable to the court; and
(4) any other sanction appropriate in the circumstances of the
case.
D. Procedure.
Prior notice of the possibility of a sanction must be given either by
a motion filed by an opposing party or by an order to show cause is-
sued by the court.223 The only opportunity to be heard required by due
process guarantees is the opportunity for the party or attorney to pres-
ent his views in writing to the court prior to the court's decision on
whether to impose a sanction.224 To accomplish this, the fourth section
of Appellate Rule 38 should read:
(d)(1) A party may by motion request that a sanction be im-
posed upon another party or attorney pursuant to this rule.
(2) If a court on its own initiative considers that a sanction
pursuant to this rule may be appropriate, the court shall order
the party or attorney to show cause in writing why a sanction
should not be imposed on the party or attorney or both.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Frivolous appeals and abusive litigation tactics have long been a
problem for the federal appellate courts.2 25 The statutes and court
rules prescribing sanctions to deal with these problems have been used
only sporadically and often without a clear understanding of the rela-
tionship among the various statutes and rules and of the separate
222. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., Whitney v. Cook, 99 U.S. 607, 607 (1878) (award of damages for frivolous
appeals favored over dismissal); Winchester v. Jackson, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 515, 515 (1806) (writ of
error dismissed with costs for want of jurisdiction).
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problems each is intended to address. Courts have wavered between
objective and subjective standards in determining when an appeal is
frivolous and when a sanction should be imposed. The opinions have
revealed the confusion of the courts, and this confusion has obscured
the objectives of the statutes and rules. As a consequence, except in the
most extreme cases, there is presently little deterrence of frivolous ap-
peals and abusive appeal tactics.
Until recently, the failure of the federal appellate courts to define
clearly the type of appeal or conduct that would subject a party or at-
torney to a sanction and their reluctance to impose sanctions had no
great effect on their caseload. In the past two decades, however, in-
creased litigation has had a dramatic impact on the federal appellate
courts with a concomitant increase in the number of meritless appeals
and actions taken by appellants or their attorneys that have no purpose
other than to harass or delay. It has now become a matter of priority
for the federal appellate courts to recognize clearly the type of conduct
that should be prevented and to use their powers to impose sanctions to
achieve that goal.
There are a number of problems with the present provisions: The
statutes and rules overlap; courts have difficulties in recognizing offen-
sive conduct; and there is no clear procedure for the imposition of sanc-
tions. The best solution to these problems is to promulgate a single rule
that: (1) directs a federal appellate court to impose a sanction for the
taking or continuation of a frivolous appeal or other proceeding, or for
engaging in abusive tactics in the prosecution of an appeal or other
proceeding in an appellate court; (2) prescribes the range of sanctions
that a court can impose; and, (3) establishes the procedure to be fol-
lowed before a sanction can be imposed. In addition, a rule compara-
ble to recently amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 should be
adopted, making the signing of a paper filed in court a certification that
it is not filed for an improper purpose. To accomplish this, Rule 38 of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure should be revised to read as
follows:
(a) A court of appeals shall impose a sanction upon a party or attor-
ney or both for taking or continuing an appeal or initiating a pro-
ceeding in the court that the court finds to be frivolous. For purposes
of this rule, a frivolous appeal is one that has no reasonable legal or
factual basis.
(b) A court of appeals shall impose a sanction upon a party or attor-
ney or both for filing a paper in violation of Rule 25(a) or for any act
of commission or omission that has an improper purpose such as to




(c) A court of appeals may impose one or more of the following
sanctions:
(1) dismissal of the appeal;
(2) striking a paper, pleading or motion;
(3) a monetary sanction including but not limited to (i) double
costs, (ii) a penalty not to exceed ten percent of the judg-
ment, (iii) damages occasioned by delay, (iv) reasonable at-
torney fees, (v) a fine payable to the court;
(4) any other sanction appropriate in the circumstances of the
case.
(d) (1) A party may by motion request that a sanction be imposed
upon another party or attorney pursuant to this rule.
(2) If a court on its own initiative considers that a sanction pur-
suant to this rule may be appropriate, the court shall order the
party or attorney to show cause in writing why a sanction
should not be imposed on the party or attorney or both.
Rule 25 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure should be
amended to include a new section (a) to precede the present section (a).
The new section should read:
(a) A party or attorney who fies a paper in a proceeding conducted
pursuant to these rules shall sign the paper. The signature of the
party or attorney or the filing of a paper without a signature consti-
tutes a certification that: the document is well grounded in fact; is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law; and is not filed for an im-
proper purpose such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of the litigation. A party or attorney
who fies a paper in violation of this rule, or the party on whose be-
half the paper is filed, is subject to a sanction in accordance with
Rule 38.
If these proposals are adopted, the federal appellate courts will be
in a better position to deter both the flow of frivolous appeals and the
use of the appellate process for improper purposes. The accomplish-
ment of these two objectives will benefit both the appellate courts and
all who must rely upon them for the resolution of appeals in a just and
expeditious manner.
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